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1 Introduction
As is well known, recovery from the recessions that occurred across advanced economies in the wake of the global
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 was associated with dismal productivity growth. While the cause of the weakness in pro-
ductivity is not well understood, one possible contributing factor is the apparent intensiﬁcation of credit market
imperfections that lasted for a number of years after the crisis. Weaker productivity growth clearly coincided with
more intense credit frictions in the United Kingdom. By 2013, UK productivity had fallen to around 15% below a
continuation of its pre-crisis trend. At the same time, the stock of real bank debt owed by UK corporations was
more than 20% below its pre-crisis peak, in part reﬂecting a tightening of credit supply, at least in the immediate
aftermath of the crisis (Bell & Young, 2010).
In this paper we investigate some of the channels by which an intensiﬁcation of credit market imperfections
might have contributed to productivity weakness. We focus on how distortions in bank lending markets due to
the ﬁnancial crisis aﬀected the exit rates of diﬀerent UK businesses. In particular, we provide evidence that credit
distortions interfered with the capital allocation process and caused some businesses to fail despite being more
productive than their surviving competitors.
Normally, one of the key drivers of aggregate productivity improvements over time is the process whereby more
productive ﬁrms gain market share and less productive ﬁrms lose market share or go out of business altogether; see,
for example, Foster et al. (2001) and Baily, Bartelsman & Haltiwanger (2001) for the US, and Disney et al. (2003)
for the UK. In a typical `cleansing' recession, this reallocation process might be accelerated, freeing resources to
be used more productively elsewhere (Schumpeter (1934); Caballero and Hammour (1994)). But this reallocation
process might be hindered or even reversed in banking crises if the key mechanisms through which productivity
growth normally arises are distorted. For example, Barlevy (2003) argues that credit market frictions may reverse
the cleansing eﬀect of recessions if highly productive ﬁrms are forced to exit as a result of not being able to access
ﬁnance. Consistent with that view, Haldane (2017) argues that for the UK economy there exist a large number
of high productivity, high debt ﬁrms (labelled as "gazelles", in contrast to low productivity, high debt "zombies")
whose expansion would be impeded by credit market imperfections.
An additional channel through which ﬁnancial crises might dampen the cleansing process of recessions is through
increased forbearance by banks. Banks with weak balance sheets may be unwilling to crystalise losses on loans and
so continue to support a number of low productivity "zombies" that would otherwise have gone out of business (see,
for example, Peek and Rosengren (2003) and Caballero et al. (2008)). For the UK, Arrowsmith et al. (2013) present
evidence to suggest that the major banks engaged in some loan forbearance in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis.
We use a quasi-experimental approach to identify the impact of changes in credit market imperfections. As we
document later in this paper, the UK banking system is highly concentrated. Four banking groups account for
around 80% of business current accounts. Moreover, typical business banking relationships are long term and it
is rare for businesses either to borrow from more than one lender or to switch from one lender to another. The
ﬁnancial crisis impacted all UK banks to some extent, but dramatically aﬀected two large banks accounting for
around half of bank lending to UK businesses in particular: Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland
both required public injections of capital in order to survive. The diﬀerential experience of these banks and their
customers provides a natural experiment by which to assess the eﬀects of stress among banks on their business
customers.
We use UK company-level information on business banking relationships to identify the impact of credit market
imperfections on ﬁrm exit rates by exploiting exogenous variation in credit availability induced by the contrasting ef-
fects which the crisis had on UK banks, distinguishing between banks which needed state support in order to survive
(DistressedBanks) from those that did not (NonDistressedBanks). We divide companies into Treatment and
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Control groups based on banking relationships established prior to the crisis. Speciﬁcally, we gauge the importance
of credit imperfections on company survival, comparing whether the exit rate for ﬁrms which, prior to the ﬁnancial
crisis, had relationships with banks which later became distressed, diﬀered from those which had relationships with
banks which did not become distressed.
To preview our results, we ﬁnd that companies that had established relationships with DistressedBanks prior
to the crisis had a higher probability of going out of business after the ﬁnancial crisis than ﬁrms which had
relationships solely with NonDistressedBanks. Furthermore, the impact of being attached to DistressedBanks
was not uniform across the distribution of ﬁrm productivity. The probability of exit for ﬁrms in the lower tail of
the productivity distribution was not adversely aﬀected by having a relationship with DistressedBanks. Indeed
there is some evidence that the least productive businesses had a better chance of survival with DistressedBanks,
consistent with them supporting zombie businesses. But for relatively more productive ﬁrms, the probability of
exit was adversely aﬀected by being with DistressedBanks. This suggests that the intensiﬁcation of credit market
imperfections following the ﬁnancial crisis distorted the possible "cleansing" eﬀect of the recession. We also present
a highly stylised theoretical model that helps explain why credit market imperfections might impinge particularly
on businesses in the middle of the productivity distribution.
The evidence we present in this paper contributes to a better understanding of the causes of strikingly weak
performance of the United Kingdom economy following the global ﬁnancial crisis. By drawing attention to the role
of an intensiﬁcation of credit market imperfections in this process we contribute to a growing post-ﬁnancial crisis
literature that is more widely applicable outside of just the UK context.
Using the crisis as an unanticipated, exogenous shock to credit conditions, a number of studies have investigated
its impact on investment and employment. For example, Duchin et al. (2010) show that the ﬁnancial crisis had
a greater impact on investment for U.S. ﬁrms which were ﬁnancially constrained prior to the onset of the crisis.
Bentolila et al. (2018) show that concerns about the solvency of Spanish banks during the ﬁnancial crisis negatively
impacted ﬁrm employment. A separate literature explores the implications of ﬁrm speciﬁc distortions in models
of heterogeneous ﬁrm productivity (see, for example, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008); Hsieh and Klenow (2009)),
although the literature on how credit market distortions in particular aﬀect exit and entry dynamics is more limited.
Recent empirical studies have found some support for the view that credit market imperfections can weaken the
"cleansing" eﬀect of recessions, in line with the view posited by Barlevy (2003). Eslava et al. (2010) investigate the
exit dynamics of Colombian manufacturing establishments over the business cycle and ﬁnd evidence to suggest that
highly productive, credit constrained ﬁrms can be forced to exit during recessions. Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers
(2013) ﬁnd evidence of an attenuation in the negative relationship between productivity and the probability of ﬁrm
exit for Indonesian manufacturing ﬁrms during the East Asian Crisis, although the attenuation does not appear to
be primarily due to a change in credit market conditions. Foster et al. (2016) ﬁnd that during the Great Recession
in the US, the impact which a ﬁrm's productivity has on its probability of exit was weaker, although they do not
explicitly link this ﬁnding to the impact of a speciﬁc distortion. In a similar study on the UK economy, Harris and
Moﬀat (2016) ﬁnd that since the ﬁnancial crisis the negative relationship which usually exists between Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) and plant closure has weakened. Focussing instead on UK ﬁrms which survived the crisis, Riley
et al. (2015) ﬁnd that during the initial downturn in 2008-2009, there was a weakening of the positive correlation
between employment growth and ﬁrms' relative productivity, particularly in sectors with small and bank-dependent
ﬁrms.
Our paper takes a similar approach to Eslava et al. (2010), investigating whether the exit margin of ﬁrms is
distorted speciﬁcally by a shift in credit conditions. But rather than using only proxies to identify credit conditions,
we instead exploit an exogenous source of variation in credit conditions faced by UK ﬁrms, induced by the banking
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relationships they maintained on the eve of the ﬁnancial crisis. In using pre-crisis relationships, we follow a similar
approach to that pioneered by Bentolila et al. (2018) and Chodorow-Reich (2014), comparing outcomes for ﬁrms
which had relationships with banks that became more distressed during the crisis with outcomes for ﬁrms which
had pre-crisis relationships with banks that were less distressed.1 As far as we are aware, ours is the ﬁrst study to
explore the eﬀect of changing credit conditions on exit dynamics for UK ﬁrms during the ﬁnancial crisis by comparing
outcomes for ﬁrms which borrowed from more distressed banks to those which borrowed from less distressed banks.
Furthermore, our study is the ﬁrst to explore how the productivity distribution of exiting ﬁrms in the UK was
impacted by such constraints.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out a theoretical framework for considering how credit
imperfections may aﬀect exit dynamics. Section 3 describes our classiﬁcation of Treatment and Control groups
and describes the UK banking system in the context of the ﬁnancial crisis, highlighting the very diﬀerent performance
of the largest four banks. Section 4 provides a description of our dataset and presents descriptive statistics. Section
5 presents our empirical framework. Section 6 reports estimation results and robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Model of Firm Dynamics
Our focus is on how credit market imperfections distort the decisions that aﬀect exit dynamics. In the absence
of distortions, typical models of ﬁrm dynamics suggest that ﬁrms with the lowest productivity are most likely to
exit a given industry (e.g. Hopenhayn (1992); Melitz (2003)). By introducing heterogeneous credit demand into
a workhorse model, we show that this result does not necessarily hold when there are credit frictions. While the
model is simplistic in a number of its assumptions, it illustrates how augmenting a workhorse heterogeneous ﬁrm
productivity model with a ﬁnancial friction which is experienced not solely by the least productive ﬁrms can result
in a distortion in the productivity distribution. Relatively productive ﬁrms which are dependent on external ﬁnance
may be forced to exit in response to a tightening in credit conditions, while relatively unproductive ﬁrms which are
less dependent on external ﬁnance may be able to survive. This is consistent with the insight of Barlevy (2003) and
the behaviour observed by Haldane (2017) that some relatively productive, debt dependent ﬁrms may be forced to
exit the market following a tightening in credit conditions.
We use a closed economy heterogeneous ﬁrm model with credit market frictions and liquidity shocks, adapting
the open economy models of Melitz (2003), Chaney (2007) and Manova (2013). A short description of the model is
provided below, with a more detailed exposition in the Appendix.
2.1 Producers
In this model, production is undertaken by a continuum of ﬁrms, each of which produces a variety. We assume that
there is a large, unbounded pool of potential entrants each period. Entrants are required to pay a ﬁxed entry cost
before discovering their productivity level which is assumed to be drawn from a known probability distribution. The
total operating cost of each ﬁrm has a ﬁxed component and a variable component that depends on its productivity.
Our assumptions about the ﬁnancing of the ﬁxed costs of production closely follow Chaney (2007) and Manova
(2013), but applied to a closed economy. We assume that ﬁrms have to pay a fraction di of the ﬁxed cost of
production, f , upfront, where 0 ≤ di ≤ 1. The remainder of the ﬁxed cost of production, given by (1− di)f , can
be paid once revenues are realised. We assume that the fraction of the ﬁxed cost to be paid upfront is independent
of ﬁrm level productivity and can take on two values, i ∈ {L,H}, where dL corresponds to a low upfront ﬁxed
1Franklin et al. (2015) also use pre-crisis banking relationships to identify credit supply shocks faced by UK ﬁrms, although they do
not group banks according to whether they became distressed or not and instead use a two stage least squares approach.
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cost requirement and dH corresponds to a high upfront ﬁxed cost requirement, such that dL ≤ dH . The ﬁxed cost
requirement is assumed to be low, dL , with probability χ and high, dH , with probability 1− χ . The fraction, di
, of the ﬁxed cost which has to be paid upfront must be ﬁnanced by borrowing from a ﬁnancial intermediary.
2.2 Financial Frictions
We assume that credit market imperfections arise because of costly state veriﬁcation and the possibility that
borrowers may choose not to repay ex post what they agreed ex ante. The perception that loans may not be repaid
gives rise to ﬁnancial frictions that aﬀect the ex ante cost of borrowing. In particular, the higher the perceived
likelihood of default the more that producers have to promise to repay when they do not default.
The ﬁnancial contract is such that at the beginning of the period producers contract with a ﬁnancial intermediary
by making a take-it or leave- it oﬀer to make a repayment F . Once revenues are realised, the intermediary receives
a repayment at the end of the period. Contracts are imperfect such that intermediaries only obtain the agreed
repayment F with probability λ ≤ 1 .2 With probability 1 − λ the ﬁrm defaults and the intermediary does not
receive F , but it is able to seize collateral from the ﬁrm. Collateral is assumed to be equal to a fraction t of the
entry cost, fe , following the approach of Manova (2013). In the case of default, the ﬁrm is able to keep its revenues
but needs to replace the collateral which is seized by the ﬁnancial intermediary, tfe. We assume that ﬁrms are not
able to retain earnings across periods to ﬁnance their ﬁxed costs and instead all proﬁts are required to be paid as
dividends to shareholders at the end of each period.3
2.3 Optimising Behavior
Upon entry, the ﬁrm faces the same problem each period, choosing its price, quantity and repayment to maximise
proﬁts subject to three constraints. These are: a) the demand for the ﬁrm's variety, derived from household utility
maximization as shown in the Appendix; b) the repayment oﬀered to the ﬁnancial intermediary must not be larger
than the ﬁrm's revenue net of its variable costs and the fraction of its ﬁxed costs which it ﬁnances itself; and c) the
expected revenue of the ﬁnancial intermediary must be at least as large as the fraction of the ﬁxed cost which it
ﬁnances.
We assume that there is perfect competition among ﬁnancial intermediaries, such that constraint c) binds with
equality. Upon entry, ﬁrms will choose to produce providing that their productivity is suﬃciently large to ensure
that proﬁts are non-negative and constraint b) is satisﬁed. Given the ﬁrm must ﬁnance di of the ﬁxed cost upfront,
we can deﬁne a productivity threshold for each level of the ﬁxed cost requirement, ϕ∗di , such that ﬁrms which draw
productivity levels below the threshold choose not to produce and exit the market.
In the standard Melitz (2003) model, the productivity threshold is deﬁned just by the productivity level which
ensures proﬁts are non-negative. In this setup, however, if the upfront ﬁxed cost requirement is suﬃciently large,
constraint b) will be more stringent than the non-negative proﬁt condition and as a result the productivity threshold
will be higher. This means that ﬁrms will have diﬀerent productivity thresholds depending on the size of the upfront
ﬁxed cost and the extent of credit frictions.
2.4 Solving the Model
In the Appendix we detail how we solve the model to ﬁnd the two productivity thresholds, ϕ∗dL and ϕ
∗
dH
that
determine whether ﬁrms with low and high upfront ﬁxed costs will exit the market. So that we can illustrate
2Manova (2013) argues that λ can reﬂect the sophistication/development of ﬁnancial institutions.
3Manova and Yu (2016) motivate this assumption by arguing that dividends have to be paid out as a result of moral hazard concerns.
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Figure 1: Impact of Credit Market Frictions on Productivity Cutoﬀs
Figure 1 illustrates how the two productivity thresholds, ϕ∗dL and ϕ
∗
dH
change as the size of the credit market friction, λ, varies. The
calibration of the model is detailed in the Appendix. An increase in λ corresponds to a reduction in credit frictions.
comparative statics, we calibrate the model, closely following the calibration approach of Melitz and Redding
(2013), with details also presented in the Appendix. When credit conditions are more restrictive as a result of a
lower value of λ, the cutoﬀ productivities are higher, meaning that some ﬁrms are now below their relevant cutoﬀ
productivity and choose to not produce anymore and exit immediately.
Using our calibrated model, we consider the extent to which contract imperfections, given by λ, aﬀect the cutoﬀ
productivities of low liquidity and high liquidity ﬁrms.
In Figure 1 we show how the implied cutoﬀs in the model, ϕ∗dL and ϕ
∗
dH
, vary as we change the degree of
contract imperfections.
When there are no contract imperfections, such that λ = 1, the implied cutoﬀs for ﬁrms with a low upfront
requirement, dL, and ﬁrms with a high upfront requirement, dH , are the same. Therefore without credit market
frictions, high upfront ﬁxed cost ﬁrms and low upfront ﬁxed cost ﬁrms are equally likely to exit. This is because, as
detailed in the Appendix, when λ = 1, the cutoﬀ condition for all ﬁrms reduces to the "zero proﬁt cutoﬀ condition",
as in the standard closed-economy Melitz (2003) model.
But for other level of credit market frictions, modelled by λ, the cutoﬀ for ﬁrms with a low upfront ﬁxed cost
requirement, ϕ∗dL , is less than or equal to the cutoﬀ for ﬁrms with a high upfront ﬁxed cost requirement,ϕ
∗
dH
.
When credit frictions exist such that λ < 1, ﬁrms with a high upfront cost requirement are more likely to
exit, since they require a higher cutoﬀ productivity level in order to survive. The higher are credit frictions (λ is
smaller) the higher is the required productivity cutoﬀ for ﬁrms which have to pay a high upfront ﬁxed cost. Given
a lower probability of being repaid, ﬁnancial intermediaries require a higher repayment from ﬁrms and therefore
ﬁrms require greater revenues. But the productivity cutoﬀ for ﬁrms which only have to pay a low upfront ﬁxed cost
is relatively insensitive to the level of credit frictions, since these ﬁrms are less reliant on obtaining ﬁnance from
ﬁnancial intermediaries to cover their ﬁxed cost of production.
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Figure 2: Impact of Credit Market Frictions on the Productivity Distribution
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Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution function of productivity levels for a high value of λ and a low value of λ. The calibration of
the model is detailed in the Appendix. In this Figure, the high value of λ is equal to 0.7 and the low value of λ is equal to 0.5.
In Figure 2, we consider how the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of productivity levels in the economy
is aﬀected by the level of credit imperfections (modelled as variation in λ). Figure 2 illustrates that when credit
frictions are more severe, the cumulative distribution at very low productivity levels is relatively unchanged. This
is because the ﬁrms with the lowest productivity are those with a low upfront ﬁxed cost requirement and the
productivity level cutoﬀ for these ﬁrms, ϕ∗dL , is relatively insensitive to the level of credit frictions, since their
reliance on external ﬁnance is low. These ﬁrms are able to ﬁnance most of their ﬁxed costs internally, and so their
decision as to whether produce or exit is relatively insensitive to the intensity of credit conditions. This is not true
of low liquidity ﬁrms that have to pay high upfront costs. More intense credit frictions aﬀect ﬁrms which have to
pay high upfront ﬁxed costs more severely, leading to a much larger change in their productivity level cutoﬀ, ϕ∗dH .
We can use this model to assess the impact of a tightening of credit conditions that aﬀects the customers of only
some of the ﬁnancial intermediaries, consistent with the UK experience after the ﬁnancial crisis. In the context of
this model, we can think of the tightening of credit conditions as an increase in the amount that producers would
have to pay lenders in states where they do not default. For this to have any eﬀect it would need to be the case
that producers are not able to switch to other lenders. As we describe later, there is clear evidence that switching
is not easy in the UK. The tightening of credit conditions can then be characterized as a reduction in the value of λ
for customers of the aﬀected banks and a rightwards shift in the productivity distribution in Figure 2. The shift in
the productivity distribution comes about because of the exit of customers with intermediate levels of productivity
who stop production rather than pay the expected cost of the ﬁnancial frictions.
In short, the model suggests that if the structure of the economy changes such that credit conditions tighten, it
will lead to the immediate exit of some ﬁrms which are dependent on external ﬁnance to pay upfront ﬁxed costs. If
the demand for external ﬁnance is not concentrated in the lower end of the productivity distribution, as assumed
here, then a tightening of credit conditions may force some relatively productive ﬁrms to exit. In our example, if
credit markets are already imperfect to some degree, ﬁrms with the very lowest productivity levels are relatively
unaﬀected by a further tightening in credit conditions, as these ﬁrms are able to exist in the economy by virtue of
not being dependent upon ﬁnancial intermediaries to ﬁnance their ﬁxed costs. Firms with the highest productivity
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levels will also be unaﬀected, as these ﬁrms are productive enough to survive regardless of whether they have low or
high upfront costs to pay. The tightening of credit conditions will aﬀect those ﬁrms with intermediate productivity
levels which have high upfront costs to pay and so are dependent upon ﬁnancial intermediaries.
3 Treatment and Control Groups
Following the approach used by Bentolila et al. (2018) and Chodorow-Reich (2014), we use the sticky nature of
relationships between ﬁrms and banks to obtain variation in the exposure of ﬁrms to the tightening of credit supply
following the ﬁnancial crisis. We deﬁne DistressedBanks as those which obtained state funding between 2008 and
2009 or required a takeover in order to survive and NonDistressedBanks as those which did not receive state
funding and did not require a takeover in order to survive. We divide our sample of ﬁrms into Treatment and
Control groups based on which banks they had relationships with in the ﬁnancial reporting year 2008, at the onset
of the ﬁnancial crisis in the UK.
In our analysis, the Treatment group consists of ﬁrms which have relationships with just DistressedBanks.
The control group consists of ﬁrms which have relationships with just NonDistressedBanks . We exclude from our
sample ﬁrms which have relationships with a combination of both DistressedBanks and NonDistressedBanks .
We also exclude ﬁrms which do not have any identiﬁable relationships with banks. We do so because ﬁrms without
any identiﬁable banking relationship are likely to be considerably diﬀerent in their characteristics than those ﬁrms
which are reliant on bank ﬁnance, as discussed in more detail below.
In the UK, four banking groups account for around 80% of business current accounts: Barclays Bank, HSBC,
Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS).4 The group of DistressedBanks in-
cludes banks belonging to LBG and RBS and a number of other smaller banks.5 The group ofNonDistressedBanks
includes banks belonging to Barclays Bank and HSBC and a number of other smaller banks.6
Our focus is on whether contractions in the supply of credit by DistressedBanks aﬀected the exit behaviour of
our Treatment group which had pre-crisis relationships exclusively with those banks relative to our Control group
which had pre-crisis relationships exclusively with NonDistressedBanks.
3.1 The UK Financial Crisis and Bank Lending to Businesses, 2008-2012
Of particular importance for our identiﬁcation strategy is that credit supply conditions tightened by more for ﬁrms
which had pre-crisis relationships withDistressedBanks than for others.
In this section we document how the elevated level of funding costs and 'near-death' experiences whichDistressedBanks
suﬀered during the crisis would suggest that they tightened credit supply conditions by more than other lenders.
3.1.1 Drivers of the Credit Crunch
It is noteworthy that our Treatment group is based on an outcome which is realized ex-post, following the ﬁnancial
crisis. Our identiﬁcation strategy would be undermined if, prior to the crisis, ﬁrms anticipated which banks would
4See "CMA Retail banking market investigation: Provisional ﬁndings report" (2015), Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.
5We also include Allied Irish Bank, Alliance and Leicester, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, Bradford and Bingley, Capital Home
Loans, First Trust Bank, Mortgage Express and Northern Rock. In November 2007, Alliance and Leicester was oﬀered a 3 billion
collateral swap by the Bank of England. It was subsequently taken over by Santander in April 2008. Northern Rock was taken into
public ownership in February 2008. In September 2008, Bradford and Bingley's retail deposit business was sold to Santander, with the
remainder of the business taken into public ownership. Mortgage Express was a specialist mortgage lender acquired by Bradford and
Bingley in 1997.
6The other banks classed as NonDistressed are Clydesdale Bank, Yorkshire Bank, Co-operative Bank, Santander, Abbey National,
Nationwide, Mortgage Works, Paragon Mortgages, Mortgage Trust, Coutts, Close Brothers, Skipton Building Society, Norwich union,
Bibby Financial Services, Venture Finance, Griﬃn Credit Services, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada and Svenska Handelsbanken.
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Figure 3: CDS Premiums of Major UK Banks
The chart shows the ﬁve-year senior CDS premia of selected UK banks. The chart plots monthly averages of daily data over the
period 2004-2015.
become DistressedBanks or if the reason banks became distressed was because they had established relationships
with poorly performing ﬁrms.
However, the credit crunch in the UK was driven by factors that were largely independent of the pre-crisis state
of the non-property corporate loan books of the major lenders (see Broadbent (2012)). The global ﬁnancial crisis
was triggered by emerging losses in the US sub-prime mortgage market. For example, in its 2008 accounts, RBS
reported a credit trading loss of ¿12.2bn, while in the same year the impairment losses on non-property corporate
lending were only ¿2.7bn.7 Widespread nervousness about the true liquidity and capital positions of banks in general
meant that the funding costs of lenders in the United Kingdom rose markedly relative to Bank Rate, making it
more expensive to fund new loans as well as the loans and facilities to which they were already committed.
Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that the fate of UK banks was anticipated prior to the crisis. As
noted by Harimohan et al. (2016), prior to the ﬁnancial crisis, funding costs for major UK banks were almost
identical. One indicator of the intensity of the crisis was the cost of insuring the unsecured debt of banks against
the risk of default as given by Credit Default Swap (CDS) premiums. As Figure 3 shows, prior to the crisis, the
CDS premiums of the major UK banks had been similar and close to zero, consistent with bank default being
considered a very low probability event by market participants. Given that private ﬁrms are unlikely to have more
information at their disposal about the health of banks than ﬁnancial market participants, it appears unlikely that
ﬁrms anticipated that some UK banks would become distressed following the ﬁnancial crisis.
The prospect of bank default triggered by the crisis meant that bank wholesale funding costs rose sharply for all
banks, but with especially severe consequences for those banks that were reliant on wholesale funding. Diﬀerences
in capital positions and exposures meant that funding costs varied markedly across the diﬀerent banks. Figure 3
shows that the increase in CDS spreads during the crisis was particularly pronounced for RBS and LBG.
3.1.2 Public Sector Support for Weak Banks
The ﬁnancial crisis threatened the survival of a number of UK lenders and required substantial recapitalisation or
takeovers for them to continue to function. Some recapitalisation was achieved by raising further equity from private
investors. But two of the major lenders, RBS and LBG, received substantial capital injections from the public sector.
The ﬁrst stage of this was the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme in October 2008 whereby the government made Tier
7See "The failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland", Financial Services Authority Board Report, December 2011.
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1 capital available to UK banks to strengthen their balance sheets. As part of the scheme, the government invested
¿20 billion in RBS and ¿17 billion in LBG. The other two major commercial lenders, Barclays and HSBC, did not
participate in the scheme. In October 2008 Barclays announced plans to raise ¿7.3 billion from private investors
and in 2009 HSBC announced plans to raise ¿12.5 billion in a rights issue.
Subsequent to this, further deterioration in conﬁdence surrounding the banking system in 2009 led the govern-
ment to establish an asset protection scheme (APS) that would put a ﬂoor to participating banks' exposure to losses
associated with impaired assets. When RBS signed up to the APS in November 2009, the government injected ¿25
billion into RBS, taking its overall capital injection to ¿45 billion. Rather than joining the APS, in November 2009
LBG was able to raise equity from its existing shareholders by a rights issue. As a major shareholder in the group,
the UK government took up its rights taking its ultimate stake in the group up to ¿20.3 billion. This stake was
subsequently reduced after the government began the disposal of its stake in September 2013.
3.1.3 Lending Commitments
The injection of public sector capital into the major UK banks was intended to support lending in the UK economy.
But despite substantial injections of public sector capital and clear directives that lending to UK businesses should
be supported, lending by the DistressedBanks fell and was generally negative in the years following the ﬁnancial
crisis.
The UK government sought to obtain commitments from the banks participating in its support schemes that
they would continue to support lending to the UK economy. Participants of the 2008 Bank Recapitalisation Scheme
committed to maintaining, over the following three years, 'the availability and active marketing of competitively-
priced lending to homeowners and to small businesses at 2007 levels. This agreement was superseded by formal
lending commitments agreed between the government and LBG and RBS on acceptance of public sector capital.
The agreements committed RBS to lend an additional ¿16 billion to businesses in the 12 months from March 2009
and LBG an additional ¿11 billion over the same period. The lending was to be on commercial terms and subject
to market demand, with further agreements made for the subsequent year.
But lending to businesses by DistressedBanks fell short of the net lending levels that they had agreed with
the government. Net lending by LBG and RBS fell between March 2009 and February 2011 as debt repayments
exceeded gross business lending.
Further lending commitments were made in February 2011 when the largest ﬁve UK lenders (Barclays, HSBC,
LBG, RBS and Santander) signed up to Project Merlin, an accord between the UK government and the major
banks. This committed them to making ¿190 billion of new credit facilities available to businesses in 2011. In total,
¿214.9 billion facilities were made available to UK businesses in 2011, 13% higher than the commitment of ¿190
billion. But gross lending to businesses by the Merlin banks totalled ¿99.9 billion, signiﬁcantly less than the size of
lending facilities made available, and net lending by these banks amounted to -¿9.6 billion. So, while the lenders
met the targets they had agreed for funds made available to businesses, the stock of actual lending to businesses
continued to fall. Furthermore, there were contrasting lending performances between the DistressedBanks and
NonDistressedBanks. The RBS Independent Lending Review (2013) reports that RBS' share of gross new lending
to all sectors excluding commercial real estate fell from 35% in 2009 to 23% in 2011. In contrast, HSBC, reported
that net lending to UK businesses increased by 6% in 2011, despite an overall market contraction, while Barclays
reported that net lending increased by 3% to UK companies in 2011.8
8See HSBC Bank PLC Annual Report and Accounts 2011, Barclays PLC Full Year 2011 Results Presentation.
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3.2 Summary
The evidence presented suggests that the shift in corporate credit supply conditions was not uniform across the
various lenders and that DistressedBanks tightened credit supply conditions by more than other lenders. While
the DistressedBanks had made lending commitments in return for public sector support, there is little evidence
that this inﬂuenced their lending behaviour.
Having a pre-crisis relationship with DistressedBanks would not have hindered ﬁrms in the post-crisis period
if they were easily able to switch lenders to obtain ﬁnance. But the relationship banking literature argues that
by acquiring information about borrowers through building banking relationships, banks are able to overcome the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard inherent in lending contracts. Such informational frictions suggest
that it would be diﬃcult for ﬁrms to switch banks. In practice, and as detailed in the description of our data below,
banking relationships do tend to be very sticky (see also Franklin et al. (2015) for the UK and Chodorow-Reich
(2014) for the US for further evidence on the stickiness of banking relationships).
Therefore, given the stickiness in banking relationships and the evidence to suggest that the contraction in credit
supply by DistressedBanks following the crisis was greater than that of NonDistressedBanks, we use pre-crisis
banking relationships as an exogenous source of credit supply constraints facing ﬁrms following the ﬁnancial crisis.
4 Data
4.1 Firm Level Data
Our source of ﬁrm-level data is the annual accounts ﬁled by UK companies, accessed via the Financial Analysis
Made Easy (FAME) dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk. In the UK, all limited and public limited companies are
required to report accounts to Companies House. This includes basic balance sheet information reported by all UK
companies.
While the FAME dataset contains information reported by all UK companies, this is quite limited for smaller
companies to minimize their reporting burden. As detailed in Table 1, over the sample period considered, small
companies were not required to report proﬁt and loss accounts and could choose to report abbreviated balance
sheets. Medium-sized companies could choose to report abbreviated proﬁt and loss accounts. This restricts some
of our subsequent analysis to mainly larger companies.
Table 1: Minimum Reporting Requirements of Firms
Balance Sheet, Proﬁt & Loss Account Turnover
Small Abbreviated Not required Not required
Medium Full Abbreviated Not required prior to 2008
Large Full Full Required
Notes: The Table reports the minimum reporting requirements by company size for our sample period, 2004-2012. The size of a company is
determined on the basis of thresholds for annual turnover, balance sheet total and number of employees. Details of the thresholds can be found
at www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house
As well as providing information on company accounts, the FAME dataset also includes a Credit Score for UK
ﬁrms, known as the "Quiscore". The Quiscore is produced by CRIF Decision Solutions Limited using a proprietary
model and is designed to reﬂect the likelihood that the company will survive over the following 12 months. Each
ﬁrm is assigned a value between 0 and 100, with a larger value indicating a higher probability of survival. The
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scores can be broadly categorised into 5 bands: 0-20 "high risk", 21-40 "caution", 41-60 "normal", 61-80 "stable"
and 81-100 "secure". There was a change in the methodology for calculating the credit rating in 2006. In particular,
a larger proportion of ﬁrms with banking relationships were considered to have a "Normal" credit rating, and a
smaller proportion had a "High risk", "Caution" or "Secure" rating. Given this, rather than using the credit rating
directly in our analysis, we consider which quintile of the credit rating distribution a ﬁrm belongs to in any given
year.
To obtain an accurate picture of the corporate landscape in the UK, we have combined snapshots of the FAME
database at an annual frequency over the period 2002-2012. This is necessary since, at any point in time, the FAME
dataset provides only a live snapshot of the information stored at Companies House. This means that information
on variables such as company structure and director information is accurate only at the time the database is accessed
and also means that a given snapshot provides a biased picture of the historical population of companies, because
many, but not all, inactive companies are removed from the database.9
Using these data, we consider companies which ﬁle accounts at an annual frequency at Companies House. We
focus on market sector companies and we exclude the agriculture, ﬁnancial and real estate industries from our
sample.10 We exclude very small companies which report total assets of less than ¿10,000. Since only incorporated
companies are required to ﬁle accounts with Companies House, the FAME dataset is not representative of sole-
proprietorships and partnerships, and these are also excluded from our analysis.
4.2 Banking Relationships
In the UK, standard practice is for commercial lenders to use ﬁxed and ﬂoating charge debentures as instruments
for lending to limited companies. A charge is the security which companies are required to provide for a loan.11
Registered companies are required to report charges/mortgages (hereafter 'charges') to Companies House within
21 days of their creation date. When registering a charge, companies are required to report the date on which
the charge was created and the name of the chargeholder. We use a textual algorithm to search for the names of
registered UK lenders within the list of chargeholders for each company within the FAME dataset.
Having identiﬁed the names of UK lenders within the list of chargeholders, we use this as an indicator of banking
relationships. The length of the relationship is proxied by the length of time between the oldest outstanding charge a
ﬁrm has with a bank and the date of the most recent ﬁnancial accounts. Evidence suggests that using chargeholder
names is a reliable indicator of banking relationships. As part of its 2013 investigation into SME forbearance
(Arrowsmith et al. (2013)), the Bank of England was able to conﬁrm that of 4,500 borrowers identiﬁed in this way
for one bank, 99.8% were current or past customers of the bank, though 14% no longer had borrowing facilities.
In our sample, a ﬁrm is considered to have an active relationship with a given bank if it has an outstanding charge
with that bank. We focus on a subsample of ﬁrms which have relationships exclusively with eitherDistressedBanks
or NonDistressedBanks. We deliberately exclude around three quarters of the companies in the FAME dataset
that do not have any outstanding charges and a further 8% of companies that either have outstanding charges with
a mixture of both DistressedBanks or NonDistressedBanks or with chargeholders that are not recognisable
UK lenders. Table 2 reports the number of ﬁrms we identify in each year as having a relationship with either
DistressedBanks or NonDistressedBanks and a breakdown of the percentage of our subsample belonging to
each of the four major banking groups. Just over half of the ﬁrms in the sample in any given year have relationships
9For a discussion of these issues using the global equivalent of the FAME dataset, see Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015).
10We identify the industry a company operates in using the 2-digit SIC 2007 code. We exclude companies operating in agriculture,
forestry and ﬁsheries industries (SIC codes 01-03), veterinary activities (SIC code 75), mining and quarrying industries (SIC codes
05-09), public sector and related industries and households (SIC codes 84-88, 91, 94, 97-99), the real estate industry (SIC code 68) and
the banking and insurance industries (SIC codes 64-66).
11A mortgage diﬀers from a charge in that it passes property to the person whom the mortgage is given.
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with DistressedBanks and of those ﬁrms the majority (around 90%) have relationships with either LBG or RBS.
Of the ﬁrms attached to NonDistressedBanks, the majority have relationships with either Barclays or HSBC.
Figure 4 presents evidence on the sticky nature of banking relationships. It shows the proportion of ﬁrms
which are initially attached solely to a bank or banking group belonging to the DistressedBanks group that
subsequently form a relationship with another lender that is not part of this group. Over the period 2002-2011,
the average switching rate at the 1 year horizon was around 3% and the switching rate at the 4 year horizon was
just 9%, implying relationships tend to be very sticky.12 From Figure 4, there is no evidence of a large increase in
switching by ﬁrms attached to DistressedBanks around the ﬁnancial crisis. It shows that the proportion of ﬁrms
switching lenders has shown little variation over time.
Table 2: Firms with Active Bank Relationships, by Banking Group
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Distressed
LBG 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17%
RBS 31% 31% 31% 32% 33% 33% 33% 33%
Distressed Other 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Distressed Mix 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Total % Distressed 52% 52% 52% 53% 54% 55% 55% 55%
Non Distressed
Barclays 18% 18% 17% 16% 16% 15% 15% 15%
HSBC 23% 23% 23% 22% 22% 21% 21% 20%
Non Distressed Other 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 6%
Non Distressed Mix 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Total % Non-Distressed 48% 48% 48% 47% 46% 45% 45% 45%
Observations 147,090 160,211 163,844 165,109 164,319 163,407 160,558 155,872
Notes: The Table reports the number of ﬁrm observations for the years 2004-2008 which have relationships with either DistressedBanks
or NonDistressedBanks. We exclude from our sample ﬁrms which do not have a registered charge with a lender and ﬁrms which have
charges with both DistressedBanks or NonDistressedBanks. For ﬁrms which had a relationship with only DistressedBanks, the Table
provides a breakdown of the percentage of ﬁrms which had exclusive relationships with RBS, LBG, other distressed banks (DistressedOther)
or a combination of diﬀerent distressed banks (DistressedMix). For ﬁrms which had a relationship with only NonDistressedBanks, the
Table provides a breakdown of the percentage of ﬁrms which had exclusive relationships with Barclays, HSBC, other non-distressed banks
(NonDistressedOther) or a combination of diﬀerent non-distressed banks (NonDistressedMix).
12The percentage of ﬁrms switching at the 1 year horizon is consistent with a survey undertaken for the Department for Business
Innovation & Skills in 2013 on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SME) ﬁnance and with a report by the House of Commons Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee in 2016. See "Small and Medium Sized Enterprise (SME) Journey Towards Raising External
Finance, A report by BMG Research, October 2013" and "Access to Finance, First Report of Session 2016-17. House of Commons
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 2016".
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Figure 4: Switching Rates for Firms with Distressed Banks
Notes: The Figure considers ﬁrm observations over the period 2002-2012 for ﬁrms which had exclusive relationships with DistressedBanks.
The Figure shows, for each year, the proportion of ﬁrms which initially had exclusive relationships with DistressedBanks and then formed a
relationship with another lender (either a bank or non-bank not part of the DistressedBanks group) after 1 year, 2 years, 3 years and 4 years.
At each horizon we focus only on ﬁrms which survive to that horizon and have charges outstanding with lenders. For example, at the four year
horizon we focus only on the subset of ﬁrms which initially have relationships with DistressedBanks and survive for at least four years and
have charges outstanding after four years.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
We begin by describing how ﬁrm exit rates evolved in the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. We consider ﬁrms which
report annual accounts and have all of their outstanding charges with eitherDistressedBanks orNonDistressedBanks.
For any given year, t , we consider ﬁrms which ﬁle accounts between April of that year and March of the following
year, in line with the ﬁnancial year in the UK. For example, a ﬁrm's annual accounts are associated with the year
2008 if it ﬁles its accounts between April 2008 and March 2009. A ﬁrm is deemed to have exited the sample in year
t if the ﬁnal accounts which the ﬁrm ﬁles are associated with year t− 1 .
In Figure 5 we plot the percentage of ﬁrm deaths between 2003 and 2012 reported by the Oﬃce for National
Statistics (ONS), based on the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). We also plot the 1 year exit rate for
ﬁrms in our full FAME sample and our FAME sample when it is restricted just to ﬁrms which had relationships
with either DistressedBanks or NonDistressedBanks. For comparability with the ONS ﬁrm death data, for our
FAME samples we plot the lagged exit rate (since, for example, the 1 year exit rate in 2010 reﬂects ﬁrms which
were present in 2010 but exited in 2011).
Figure 5 shows that the death rate reported by the ONS tends to be higher than the proportion of ﬁrms exiting
the FAME sample. This likely reﬂects the greater coverage of smaller businesses in the IDBR, in particular the
inclusion of sole-proprietorships and partnerships which are not captured in the FAME sample. To the extent that
smaller businesses face a higher probability of failure, it is not surprising that the level of death rates reported by the
ONS exceeds the exit rates in our FAME sample. The exit rate using our full FAME sample is higher than the exit
rate using our sample of ﬁrms which have a relationship with either DistressedBanks or NonDistressedBanks,
which is also likely to reﬂect the greater prevalence of smaller ﬁrms in the full FAME sample. Comparing the proﬁle
of the ONS ﬁrm death series and the FAME exit rates, it is notable that ﬁrm death rates and exit rates did not
increase substantially following the ﬁnancial crisis. In the ONS ﬁrm death series, there was a modest pick-up in
2009 which subsequently receded.13 In our FAME sample exit rates increase modestly in 2008 before receding.
13Barnett et al. (2014) document how the increase in ﬁrm deaths in the ﬁnancial crisis was very modest in comparison to increases
in the 1980s and 1990s.
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Figure 5: ONS ﬁrm death rate
The ﬁgure plots the percentage of ﬁrm deaths in a given year reported by the ONS using the IDBR. For comparison we plot the one year exit
rate of ﬁrms in the FAME sample. For comparability with the ONS ﬁrm death data, for our FAME samples in year x we plot the 1 year exit
rate in year x− 1.
The chart shows that roughly 5% of all ﬁrms with a bank lending relationship in existence in one year had gone
out of business by the next year. It is important to note that ﬁrms may exit for a variety of reasons, some of which
may not be related to business failure. For example, a ﬁrm may exit voluntarily due to the directors of the business
retiring. Alternatively, a ﬁrm may exit if it is acquired by another ﬁrm.14
Figure 6 plots the share of ﬁrms which exited within 1 year, 2 years, 3 years and 4 years over the period 2003-
2011, split by whether the ﬁrm had exclusive relationships with DistressedBanks or NonDistressedBanks. The
ﬁgure excludes observations for which the exit horizon spans both the Pre-crisis and Post-crisis period (e.g. the
percentage of ﬁrms in 2005 which exited within 4 years).
Figure 6 shows that exit rates were very similar, regardless of the type of bank. However, in the pre-crisis period,
the exit rate at all horizons was slightly higher for ﬁrms with NonDistressedBanks than for ﬁrms attached
to DistressedBanks. This pattern then reversed after the ﬁnancial crisis: the exit rate at all horizons was
higher for ﬁrms with DistressedBanks than for ﬁrms attached to NonDistressedBanks.15 This provides further
motivation for exploring whether, after controlling for diﬀerences between ﬁrms with NonDistressedBanks and
ﬁrms withDistressedBanks, having a relationship with DistressedBanks adversely aﬀected the probability of
exit following the crisis.
14Note that acquisitions do not necessarily result in ﬁrm exit.
15It is also notable that after the ﬁnancial crisis, exit rates were slightly lower. This is consistent with evidence presented by Harris
and Moﬀat (2016) which uses plant-level data from the Annual Business Survey (ABS) conducted by the Oﬃ ce for National Statistics
(ONS) and ﬁnds that there has been a fall in the probability of plant closure since 2008 in all sectors other than retailing.
14
Figure 6: Exit Rates, by Banking Relationship
The ﬁgure plots the percentage of ﬁrms which exit the sample at the 1 year, 2 year, 3 year and 4 year horizon, split by ﬁrms which have a
relationship with DistressedBanks (D) and NonDistressedBanks (ND). The chart is split by the Pre-crisis (before 2008) and Post-crisis
period. The chart excludes observations for which the exit horizon spans both the Pre-crisis and Post-crisis period.
In Table 3, we compare the proﬁle of ﬁrms in our sample in 2004, 2006 and 2008 which had relationships
exclusively with NonDistressedBanks or DistressedBanks. For comparison, we also include ﬁrms which did not
have a borrowing relationship with any bank. The year 2008 is selected to coincide with the onset of the ﬁnancial
crisis. The top two rows of Table 3 show what is illustrated in Figure 6: that the proportion of ﬁrms in 2004 and
2006 which subsequently exited within 2 or 4 years was the same or slightly higher for ﬁrms which had exclusive
relationships with NonDistressedBanks, but in 2008 this pattern reversed. Table 3 also compares the credit
rating of ﬁrms with NonDistressedBanks and ﬁrms with DistressedBanks. The table suggests that there was
little diﬀerence between the credit proﬁle of ﬁrms with NonDistressedBanks and DistressedBanks. There are
some, albeit small, diﬀerences in the size and age structure of ﬁrms with DistressedBanks relative to ﬁrms with
NonDistressedBanks.
The number of ﬁrms which have relationships with either NonDistressedBanks or DistressedBanks is small
in comparison to the number of ﬁrms which do not have a borrowing relationship. Table 3 shows that those ﬁrms
without a borrowing relationship are considerably diﬀerent in nature than ﬁrms with a borrowing relationship . In
particular, ﬁrms without a borrowing relationship are smaller and younger on average, are slightly less leveraged,
are considered to be higher risk and have considerably higher exit rates than ﬁrms which have relationships with
NonDistressedBanks or DistressedBanks. Figure 7 plots the cumulative frequency distribution of ﬁrm size,
given by total assets, for ﬁrms which have relationships with NonDistressedBanks or DistressedBanks and
for ﬁrms which do not have a borrowing relationship in the year 2006. It illustrates that for the ﬁrms without a
borrowing relationship, a much larger proportion of those ﬁrms are very small in size relative to ﬁrms which have
banking relationships with either NonDistressedBanks or DistressedBanks. Because of their lack of similarity
to ﬁrms with banking relationships, we exclude ﬁrms which do not have any bank charges from our subsequent
analysis.
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Figure 7: Size Distribution of Firms in 2006, by Banking Relationship
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 1000 2000 3000
Total assets (£000s)
All firms No bank firms
Non−distressed bank firms Distressed bank firms
The ﬁgure plots the cumulative distribution function of ﬁrms' total assets in the year 2006 for four groups of ﬁrms: the whole sample of ﬁrms in our
FAME dataset, ﬁrms which have no bank charges (No bank ﬁrms) and ﬁrms which have relationships either just with NonDistressedBanks
or just with DistressedBanks. We exclude ﬁrms with total assets less than ¿10,000.
Table 3: Summary Statistics, by Banking Relationship
2004 2006 2008
ND D No Bank ND D No Bank ND D No Bank
Exit in 2 years 10% 10% 12% 12% 12% 15% 11% 11% 14%
Exit in 4 years 21% 20% 25% 22% 22% 27% 19% 20% 24%
Start-Up 14% 12% 31% 8% 8% 21% 6% 7% 23%
Young 33% 32% 56% 31% 30% 59% 25% 27% 55%
Foreign Owned 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Exporter 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1%
Median Assets (¿000) 301 382 54 276 356 56 301 382 54
Median Leverage Ratio 0.75 0.76 0.71 0.75 0.74 0.68 0.75 0.76 0.71
Credit Rating
Lowest Quintile 25% 24% 18% 12% 12% 15% 12% 12% 17%
Quintile 2 26% 26% 18% 13% 12% 26% 12% 11% 27%
Quintile 3 17% 17% 18% 16% 15% 20% 17% 16% 22%
Quintile 4 14% 14% 15% 23% 23% 21% 18% 18% 19%
Highest Quintile 16% 15% 28% 33% 35% 15% 39% 40% 14%
Observations 70441 76649 429468 78240 85604 500601 75528 88791 574633
Notes: The Table reports summary statistics for ﬁrms which had relationships exclusively with DistressedBanks (D) or NonDistressedBanks
(ND), as well as ﬁrms which have no identiﬁed bank relationship in 2004, 2006 and 2008. We exclude ﬁrms with total assets of less than ¿10,000.
Exit in 2 years describes the percentage of ﬁrms which appear in the sample in year t, but subsequently drop out of the sample in year t + 1
or t + 2. Exit in 4 years is the percentage of ﬁrms which appear in the sample in year t, but subsequently drop out of the sample in year
t + 1,t + 2, t + 3 or t + 4. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a Start-up if it is aged between 0 and 2 years and Young if it is aged between 0 and 5 years.
A ﬁrm is deﬁned as an Exporter is they report overseas turnover. Leverage is deﬁned as total liabilities divided by total assets.The Credit
Rating of each ﬁrm is based on the Quiscore assigned to a ﬁrm. The Quiscore is a number in the range 0-100 measuring the likelihood that
a ﬁrm will fail in the next 12 months . Based on the Quiscore, we calculate the quintile of the credit rating distribution a ﬁrm belongs to in
any given year.
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5 Exit Dynamics - Empirical Speciﬁcation
In our baseline empirical framework, we seek to explore how the probability of ﬁrm exit is aﬀected by tighter
credit conditions, controlling for industry and ﬁrm characteristics. Our key identifying assumption is that trends in
exit probabilities are the same among ﬁrms which have relationships with DistressedBanks as ﬁrms which have
relationships with NonDistressedBanks in the absence of changes in the supply of credit following the ﬁnancial
crisis. In our baseline speciﬁcation, we use a linear probability model to investigate whether having a relationships
with DistressedBanks at time t aﬀects the likelihood of exit in the subsequent period for ﬁrm i in industry j:
Yi,t = γj +Xi,tκ+ β1 ×DistressedBanki,t + β2 × PostCrisist (1)
+β3 ×DistressedBanki,t × PostCrisist + εi,t
where
Yi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if ﬁrm i subsequently exits in
the speciﬁed time frame and 0 otherwise
γj are industry ﬁxed eﬀects
Xi,t is a matrix of controls for ﬁrm i at time t
DistressedBanki,t is an indicator variable equal to one if all of the outstanding
charges for ﬁrm i at time t are with a bank which became
distressed during the ﬁnancial crisis and 0 otherwise.
PostCrisist is an indicator variable equal to 0 prior to 2008 and 1 otherwise.
εi,t is an i.i.d. error term
We compare the diﬀerence in exit rates after the ﬁnancial crisis between ﬁrms with DistressedBanks and ﬁrms
with NonDistressedBanks with the diﬀerence in exit rates prior to the ﬁnancial crisis.16 The coeﬃcient of interest
in Equation 1 is β3 , which captures the change in the exit rate between the pre-crisis and post-crisis period for ﬁrms
which had relationships with DistressedBanks relative to the change experienced by ﬁrms which had relationships
with NonDistressedBanks. A positive coeﬃcient on β3 would imply that the change in exit rates for ﬁrms which
had relationships with DistressedBanks between the pre-crisis and post-crisis period was higher than the change
for ﬁrms which had relationships with NonDistressedBanks.
In using banking relationships which existed on the eve of the ﬁnancial crisis as an exogenous source of variation
in credit conditions, we diﬀer from the existing literature on the implications of tighter credit conditions on ﬁrm
exit. Eslava et al. (2010), for example, use a proxy for the credit conditions faced by ﬁrms, calculated by interacting
a measure of the ﬁnancial external dependence of an industry with a proxy for a ﬁrm's ability to access credit.
16In contrast to a standard diﬀerence in diﬀerence framework, the treatment variable can vary over time. In particular, in the pre-crisis
period a ﬁrm is classed as being attached to DistressedBanks if all of its outstanding charges in that year, rather than in 2008, were
with banks which subsequently became distressed. Deﬁning the treatment group based just on relationships which existed in 2008 would
require all ﬁrms in the pre-crisis period to survive until 2008 and so would not facilitate an analysis of the probability of ﬁrm exit.
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We consider how a tightening in credit conditions impacted on the exit rates at diﬀerent horizons. We compare
exit rates in a window before the crisis with exit rates at the same horizon after the crisis. We choose the windows
that are closest to the ﬁnancial crisis. Speciﬁcally, we compare the one-year exit rate in 2007 (ﬁrms which are
present in 2007 but not in 2008) with the one-year exit rate in 2008 (ﬁrms that are present in 2008 but not in
2009).17 We also compare the two year exit rate in 2006 (ﬁrms which are present in 2006 but exited between
2007-2008) with the two year exit rate in 2008 (ﬁrms which were present in 2008 but exited between 2009-2010),
the three year exit rate in 2005 (ﬁrms present in 2005 but exited between 2006-2008) with the three year exit rate
in 2008 (ﬁrms present in 2008 but exited between 2009-2011) and the four year exit rate in 2004 (ﬁrms present in
2004 but exited between 2005-2008) with the four year exit rate in 2008 (ﬁrms present in 2008 but exited between
2009-2012).
The estimates from our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation will be biased if we do not account for time- varying
diﬀerences between ﬁrms with DistressedBanks and ﬁrms with NonDistressedBanks that are unrelated to the
tightening in credit conditions. To overcome this concern, we control for a number of ﬁrm characteristics, given by
Xi,t in our speciﬁcation. In our baseline analysis, we control for the age of the ﬁrm, the length of a ﬁrm's banking
relationship, whether a ﬁrm is foreign owned, whether a ﬁrm is an exporter, the credit score grouping of the ﬁrm,
whether the ﬁrm has had any county court judgements in the past two years, the size of the ﬁrm given by the
quintile of the asset distribution it is in and the type of accounts the ﬁrm ﬁles.
6 Results
6.1 Baseline Results
The results from estimating our baseline speciﬁcation (1) are presented in Table 4. We consider speciﬁcations
without ﬁrm controls and industry ﬁxed eﬀects (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) and with ﬁrm controls and industry ﬁxed
eﬀects ( columns 2, 4, 6 and 8). The ﬁrst row reports estimates of β1 and, after controlling for ﬁrm charac-
teristics, suggests that prior to the ﬁnancial crisis, the probability of exit for ﬁrms which had relationships with
DistressedBanks was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the probability of exit for ﬁrms which had relationships with
NonDistressedBanks. The second row reports estimates of β2 and, after controlling for ﬁrm characteristics,
suggests that for ﬁrms which had relationships with NonDistressedBanks, the one-year exit probability fell fol-
lowing the crisis, but the exit probability at the three-year and four-year horizons rose suggesting the eﬀects of
the crisis on ﬁrm exit rates took time to emerge. The ﬁnal row reports estimates of the coeﬃcient of interest, β3,
showing the change in exit probability following the ﬁnancial crisis for ﬁrms attached to DistressedBanks relative
to the change for NonDistressedBanks. The change in the probability of exit at the two-, three- and four-year
horizons is signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms with DistressedBanks following the crisis than for ﬁrms attached to
NonDistressedBanks. At these horizons, the change in the probability of exit is slightly smaller in those speciﬁ-
cations which include ﬁrm controls. The estimates suggest that the change in the probability of exit at the two-year
horizon was around 0.4 percentage points higher for ﬁrms which had a relationship with DistressedBanks relative
to ﬁrms with NonDistressedBanks and the probability of exit within four years was around 0.9 percentage points
higher. These eﬀects on the probability of exit are material. To provide some context for the magnitude of these
eﬀects, the average exit rate is around 10% at the two-year horizon and 20% at the four-year horizon (Figure 6).
17Given the way in which we assign ﬁrm accounts to years, detailed above, ﬁrms present in 2007 will include all ﬁrms ﬁling accounts
between April 2007 and March 2008 and these ﬁrms are deemed to have exited within one year if they do not ﬁle accounts from April
2008 onward. We address the concern that the tightening of credit conditions associated with the ﬁnancial crisis may have already been
experienced by some ﬁrms before April 2009 in our robustness tests.
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The lack of a signiﬁcant eﬀect at the one-year horizon suggests that the estimated eﬀect on the aggregate population
of ﬁrms took time to become apparent.
Table 4: Eﬀect of a Distressed Bank Relationship on Firm Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 2 Year 3 Year 3 Year 4 Year 4 Year
Distressed -0.003 0.001 -0.007*** -0.000 -0.006** 0.000 -0.007** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Post-Crisis -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.003 -0.007** 0.014*** -0.012*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.002 0.000 0.007*** 0.004** 0.008*** 0.006** 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mean Exit Rate 0.060 0.046 0.116 0.100 0.161 0.149 0.202 0.190
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-Squared 0.072 0.101 0.136 0.174 0.188 0.226 0.230 0.270
Observations 329428 322069 328163 320485 324530 315623 311409 302870
Notes: The Table reports the empirical link between the probability of a ﬁrm exiting an industry and the banking relationships a ﬁrm has. In
Columns 1 and 2 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2006 and 2008. The dependent variable in Columns 1
and 2 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 2 years. In Columns 3 and 4 we consider the probability
of exit within three years for ﬁrms present in 2005 and 2008. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is a dummy variable equal to one if
the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 3 years. In Columns 5 and 6 we consider the probability of exit within four years for ﬁrms present
in 2004 and 2008. The dependent variable in Columns 5 and 6 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following
4 years. Distressed is an indicator variable equal to one if a ﬁrm has all of its relationships with banks which became distressed during the
ﬁnancial crisis and zero otherwise. Post− crisis is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation year is 2008 and zero otherwise. Both
speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls. Industry ﬁxed eﬀects at the 2-digit SIC code level. The ﬁrm controls included
are firm size, (measured by the quintile in the distribution of total assets), credit score (measured by quintile of the credit score
distribution), county court judgements (measured by the number of county court judgments in the previous 2 years), the age of the ﬁrm, the
banking relationship age, whether a ﬁrm is foreign owned, whether a ﬁrm is an exporter and whether a ﬁrm ﬁles full or consolidated
accounts. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, in parentheses, where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
signiﬁcance levels respectively.
6.2 Exit Dynamics and Financially Constrained Firms
The stylized model presented in Section 2 suggests that ﬁrms that are not highly leveraged are less likely to be
susceptible to a change in credit conditions as this would have less impact on the amount they are obliged to repay
when they do not default. To explore this, in Table 5 we consider whether the adverse impact of being attached to
DistressedBanks on the probability of ﬁrm exit diﬀered depending on ﬁrm leverage. We measure ﬁrm leverage as
the ratio of total liabilities (current and non-current) to total assets18:
Leveragei,t =
Total Liabilitiesi,t
Total Assetsi,t
We use our measure of ﬁrm leverage,Leveragei,t , to divide our sample into leverage quartiles, by year.
19 We
then estimate our baseline speciﬁcation, given by equation (1), allowing the key coeﬃcients of interest β1 , β2 and
β3 to diﬀer depending upon the quartile of the ﬁrm leverage distribution a ﬁrm is in. Our speciﬁcation is given by:
18We use total liabilities to calculate our measure of leverage because it is well reported across the size distribution of ﬁrms in our
sample. However total liabilities will include liabilities which do not directly arise from ﬁnancing activities, for example deferred taxes
and pension liabilities, and are therefore less relevant when considering whether a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained.
19The lowest quartile consists of ﬁrms with leverage of around 0.5 or less. Of those ﬁrms in the lowest quartile, just under 20% of
ﬁrms have leverage of less than 0.1 The highest quartile consists of ﬁrms with leverage of around 0.95 or more.
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Yi,t, = γj +Xi,tκ+
4∑
k=1
β1,k(DistressedBanki × Levi,k,t) (2)
+
4∑
k=1
β2,k(PostCrisist × Levi,k,t)
+
4∑
k=1
β3,k(DistressedBanki × PostCrisist × Levi,k,t) + εi,t
where
Levi,k,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the leverage of ﬁrm i at time t is in quartile k of the
leverage distribution and 0 otherwise.
The results suggest that the adverse eﬀect of being attached to DistressedBanks is predominantly felt by
ﬁrms with higher leverage, though splitting the sample into diﬀerent groups weakens the precision of the estimation
somewhat. The largest positive eﬀects on exit are in the top quartile of the leverage distribution, with for example
the four-year exit rate being 2 percentage points higher for ﬁrms in the top quartile.
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Table 5: Eﬀect of a Distressed Bank Relationship on Firm Exit, by Leverage Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year
Lowest Leverage Quartile 1
Distressed 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Post-crisis -0.004*** -0.003 -0.010** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Distressed * Post-Crisis -0.001 0.001 0.005 0.006
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Leverage Quartile 2
Distressed 0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Post-Crisis -0.002 0.001 0.014*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.001 0.006** 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Leverage Quartile 3
Distressed 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Post-Crisis -0.005** 0.005* 0.031*** 0.054***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Highest Leverage Quartile
Distressed -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Post-Crisis -0.013*** -0.015*** 0.005 0.034***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.002 0.007 0.015** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Mean Exit Rate
Quartile 1 0.026 0.066 0.104 0.137
Quartile 2 0.021 0.057 0.094 0.128
Quartile 3 0.039 0.099 0.151 0.192
Quartile 4 0.081 0.179 0.253 0.310
Industry Fixed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.102 0.176 0.229 0.273
Observations 322069 320485 315623 302870
The Table reports estimates of Equation 1, allowing the key coeﬃcients of interest β1, β2 and β3 to diﬀer depending upon the quartile of the
ﬁrm leverage distribution a ﬁrm is in. In Column 1 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2006 and 2008.
The dependent variable in Column 1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 2 years. In Column 2 we
consider the probability of exit within three years for ﬁrms present in 2005 and 2008. In Column 3 we consider the probability of exit within
four years for ﬁrms present in 2004 and 2008. Distressed is an indicator variable equal to one if a ﬁrm has all of its relationships with banks
which became distressed during the ﬁnancial crisis and zero otherwise. Post − Crisis is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation
year is 2008 and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
industry level, in parentheses, where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%,5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels respectively.
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6.3 Exit Dynamics and Productivity
Standard models of ﬁrm dynamics suggest that in the absence of distortions, ﬁrms with a lower level of productivity
should face a higher probability of exit (see, for example, the model in Section 2 without credit market imperfec-
tions and Hopenhayn (1992)). Furthermore, the "cleansing" view suggests that the "weeding out" of ineﬃcient
ﬁrms is accentuated during recessions. Therefore, according to the "cleansing" view, the eﬀect which being a low
productivity ﬁrm has on the probability of ﬁrm exit should be magniﬁed during recessions.
As discussed in our model of ﬁrm dynamics, if there are credit market frictions associated with recessions which
are not limited to just the lowest productivity ﬁrms, then the "cleansing" eﬀect may be weakened. If, for example,
the most productive ﬁrms in an economy are also highly leveraged and susceptible to a tightening in credit conditions
during a recession, then the "cleansing" eﬀect may be distorted. In this section, we extend our baseline speciﬁcation
to consider how the results vary across the productivity distribution. We then consider whether variation in our
results across the productivity distribution is the result of variation in the leverage of ﬁrms. We split the observations
into productivity quartiles, based on a proxy for gross value added productivity given by:
Productivityi,t =
GVAi,t
Employeesi,t
whereGV Ai,t is a proxy of gross value added in real terms given by the sum of a ﬁrm's reportedOperating Profits,
Depreciation and the CostOf Employees, deﬂated by industry deﬂators. We use GVA deﬂators, published by the
ONS at the two-digit and three-digit SIC code level.
In Table 6, we present summary statistics for the ﬁrms in our productivity sample, split by whether they had
exclusive relationships withDistressedBanks or NonDistressedBanks. Because of lighter reporting requirements
for small companies (Table 1), the number of companies in the productivity sample is considerably smaller than
that considered in our baseline speciﬁcation. This reﬂects the fact that the productivity sample is composed only of
ﬁrms which report Operating Profits, CostOf Employees and Employees in their accounts. Relative to the full
sample, summarised in Table 3, ﬁrms in the productivity sample on average are older, larger, have lower leverage
ratios and are less likely to exit. Nevertheless, in the productivity sample there is little diﬀerence between the credit
proﬁle and average size of ﬁrms with DistressedBanks and ﬁrms with NonDistressedBanks.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Productivity Sample, by Banking Relationship
2004 2006 2008
ND D ND D ND D
Exit in 2 Years 6% 5% 7% 7% 5% 6%
Exit in 4 years 14% 13% 13% 13% 11% 11%
Start-Up 5% 5% 3% 4% 3% 4%
Young 17% 17% 13% 14% 11% 13%
Foreign Owned 16% 15% 16% 15% 19% 17%
Exporter 18% 18% 18% 17% 19% 17%
Median Assets (¿000) 2526 2734 3191 3408 3851 3952
Median Leverage Ratio 0.70 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.68
Credit Rating
Lowest Quintile 17% 16% 2% 2% 1% 1%
Quintile 2 25% 27% 2% 2% 1% 1%
Quintile 3 20% 21% 2% 1% 1% 2%
Quintile 4 16% 16% 6% 6% 3% 4%
Highest Quintile 18% 17% 85% 87% 91% 91%
Observations 5140 6714 4853 6526 4629 6586
Notes: The Table reports summary statistics for ﬁrms which had relationships exclusively with DistressedBanks (D) or NonDistressedBanks
(ND) in our productivity sample. We exclude ﬁrms with total assets of less than ¿10,000 and ﬁrms which do not have exclusive banking
relationships with DistressedBanks (D) or NonDistressedBanks (ND) . Exit in 2 years describes the percentage of ﬁrms which appear in
the sample in year t, but subsequently drop out of the sample in year t+ 1 or t+ 2. Exit in 4 years is the percentage of ﬁrms which appear in
the sample in year t, but subsequently drop out of the sample in year t + 1,t + 2, t + 3 or t + 4. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a Start-up if it is aged
between 0 and 2 years and Young if it is aged between 0 and 5 years. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as an Exporter is they report overseas turnover. The
Credit Rating of each ﬁrm is based on the Quiscore assigned to a ﬁrm. The Quiscore is a number in the range 0-100 measuring the likelihood
that a ﬁrm will fail in the next 12 months. Based on the Quiscore, we calculate the quintile of the credit rating distribution a ﬁrm belongs to
in any given year.
In Figure 8 we compare the productivity distribution of exiting ﬁrms in the pre-crisis period with the post-crisis
period. Figure 8 considers only ﬁrms which had outstanding borrowing relationships with banks and plots the
productivity distribution, by quartile, of those ﬁrms which exited in the four years following 2004 and the four years
following 2008. The two distributions are very similar, though a slightly smaller proportion of ﬁrms exiting in the
four years after 2008 were in the lowest quartile of the productivity distribution than in the four years after 2004,
contrary to the cleansing view.
In Figures 9 and 10, we look separately at the productivity distribution of exiting ﬁrms for ﬁrms attached to
NonDistressedBanks and DistressedBanks. For NonDistressedBanks, the percentage of ﬁrms exiting from
the lowest productivity quartile was higher in the years following the ﬁnancial crisis than in the years following 2004,
consistent with the "cleansing view". In contrast, for DistressedBanks, the percentage of exiting ﬁrms which were
in the lowest quartile was lower following the ﬁnancial crisis, contrary to the cleansing view. These patterns are
consistent with the predictions of our model in section 2, which suggests that greater ﬁnancial frictions will increase
the exit of ﬁrms with intermediate levels of productivity.
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Figure 8: Productivity Distribution of Exiting Firms, by Productivity Quartile
The chart shows the distribution of exiting ﬁrms in the four years after 2004 and 2008, across the productivity distribution. The sum of the
bars in any given year is 100%. We consider only those ﬁrms which had outstanding bank charges in either 2004 or 2008. The productivity
distribution is split into quartiles, with 1 equal to the lowest quartile of the distribution in a given year and 4 equal to the highest quartile.
Figure 9: Firms which Exited and Banked with
Non-Distressed Banks
Figure 10: Firms which Exited and Banked with
Distressed Banks
To explore empirically the impact of restricted credit availability on ﬁrms in our productivity sample, we ﬁrst
estimate our baseline speciﬁcation, given by Equation (1), for just our productivity sample.
The results, presented in Table 7, suggest that, unlike in the full sample, for the productivity sample of ﬁrms hav-
ing a relationship with DistressedBanks did not signiﬁcantly increase the probability of exit relative to ﬁrms with
NonDistressedBanks on average. The estimated coeﬃcients on the interaction term between DistressedBanks
and PostCrisis remain positive and similar in magnitude to those reported in Table 4, but are no longer statisti-
cally signiﬁcant due to the larger standard errors. The lack of signiﬁcance for the smaller productivity sample is
likely to be due to the fact that the sample is composed of ﬁrms which are on average larger in size, with lower
leverage and more established than ﬁrms in the baseline sample. As a result of being larger and more established,
these ﬁrms may be less susceptible to a tightening in bank credit conditions. In addition, the reduced size of the
productivity sample means the precision with which we can determine the coeﬃcients of our model is less than for
the full sample.
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Table 7: Eﬀect of a distressed bank relationship on ﬁrm exit, productivity sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year
Distressed -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.014**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Post-Crisis -0.008*** -0.003 0.016** 0.038***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.009
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Mean Exit Rate 0.020 0.049 0.079 0.110
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.065 0.107 0.142 0.186
Observations 20845 20882 21154 21271
Notes: The Table reports the empirical link between the probability of a ﬁrm exiting an industry and the banking relationships a ﬁrm has. In
Column 1 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2006 and 2008. The dependent variable in Column 1 is a
dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 2 years. In Column 2 we consider the probability of exit within
three years for ﬁrms present in 2005 and 2008. The dependent variable in Column 2 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently
exits in the following 3 years. In Column 3 we consider the probability of exit within four years for ﬁrms present in 2004 and 2008. The
dependent variable in Column 3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 4 years. Distressed is an
indicator variable equal to one if a ﬁrm has all of its relationships with banks which became distressed during the ﬁnancial crisis and zero
otherwise. Post− crisis is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation year is 2008 and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include
industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, in parentheses, where ***, **, * shows
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels respectively.
To investigate whether restricted credit availability following the crisis distorted the diﬀerence in exit rates
between high productivity and low productivity ﬁrms in our productivity sample, we interact the three key variables
of interest in our baseline speciﬁcation (DistressedBank , PostCrisis andPostCrisis ×DistressedBank) with
indicator variables for the productivity quartile a ﬁrm is in. We also continue to include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and
ﬁrm speciﬁc controls.20 Our speciﬁcation is therefore given by:
Yi,t, = γj +Xi,tκ+
4∑
k=1
β1,k(DistressedBanki × Prodi,k,t) (3)
+
4∑
k=1
β2,k(PostCrisist × Prodi,k,t)
+
4∑
k=1
β3,k(DistressedBanki × PostCrisist × Prodi,k,t) + εi,t
where
Prodi,k,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the productivity of ﬁrm i at time t
is in quartile k of the productivity distribution and 0 otherwise.
Table 8 reports the results from estimating equation 3, showing estimates of the coeﬃcient of interest, β3,k,
20We also consider estimating the baseline speciﬁcation separately for each productivity quartile, allowing for industry ﬁxed eﬀects
which vary across quartile. This produces results which are qualitatively similar.
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for each productivity quartile k. We consider the impact of having a relationship with DistressedBanks on the
probability of exit at the one-year to four-year horizons.
Focusing ﬁrst on the results for NonDistressedBanks, there is again evidence that the adverse eﬀect of the
crisis on ﬁrm exit rates take time to come through. The coeﬃcient on the post-crisis dummy is mainly negative
and signiﬁcant at the one-year and two-year horizons before becoming predominantly positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the three-year and four-year horizons. This would be consistent with the NonDistressedBanks
oﬀering forbearance and support to distressed businesses in the immediate aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, but
withdrawing this in the later period that stretches to 2013. Moreover, there is evidence here of an eventual cleansing
eﬀect reﬂected in the four-year exit rate being 5.3 percentage points higher post crisis for the lowest productivity
ﬁrms and only 2.3 percentage points higher for high productivity ﬁrms.
Our earlier results (reported in Table 4) suggested an increase in the exit probability following the ﬁnancial
crisis for ﬁrms attached to DistressedBanks relative to the change for NonDistressedBanks. But the results
in Table 8 suggest that rather than this eﬀect being focused among low productivity ﬁrms, as would be consistent
with the cleansing view, it was more concentrated among intermediate productivity ﬁrms as suggested by the
model presented in Section 2. Indeed, for ﬁrms in the lowest productive quartile, the results reported in Table 8
suggest that the probability of exit for low productivity ﬁrms was actually lower for ﬁrms with DistressedBanks
than NonDistressedBanks. For ﬁrms in the lowest productivity quartile, at the one-year and two-year hori-
zons the change in exit probability was signiﬁcantly lower (around 2-3 percentage points) for ﬁrms attached to
DistressedBanks relative to the change for ﬁrms attached to NonDistressedBanks. At the three and four year
horizon, the estimated coeﬃcients on the interaction term between DistresedBanks and PostCrisis for ﬁrms in
the lowest productivity quartile are also negative, but not signiﬁcant. These results are consistent with distressed
banks supporting low productivity zombie businesses.
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Table 8: Eﬀect of a Distressed Bank Relationship on Firm Exit, by Productivity Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year
Lowest Productivity Quartile
Distressed 0.010 0.013 0.008 -0.008
(0.008) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
Post-Crisis 0.004 0.014 0.026* 0.053***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019)
Distressed * Post-Crisis -0.024** -0.029* -0.037 -0.024
(0.011) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024)
Productivity Quartile 2
Distressed -0.008 -0.011 -0.029*** -0.013
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Post-Crisis -0.012** -0.021** -0.019** 0.009
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.015** 0.020* 0.047*** 0.037**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
Productivity Quartile 3
Distressed -0.012** -0.010 -0.003 -0.013
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Post-Crisis -0.015*** -0.013* 0.016 0.034**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.015** 0.017* 0.000 0.009
(0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.018)
Highest Productivity Quartile 4
Distressed -0.010 -0.006 0.008 -0.018**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Post-Crisis -0.010** 0.006 0.024** 0.023*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.009 0.002 -0.011 0.012
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Mean Exit Rate
Quartile 1 0.031 0.078 0.129 0.178
Quartile 2 0.019 0.048 0.075 0.100
Quartile 3 0.011 0.036 0.058 0.087
Quartile 4 0.010 0.033 0.057 0.080
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.067 0.110 0.147 0.190
Observations 20845 20882 21154 21271
The Table reports estimates of Equation 3. In Column 1 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2006 and 2008.
The dependent variable in Column 1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 2 years. In Column 2 we
consider the probability of exit within three years for ﬁrms present in 2005 and 2008. In Column 3 we consider the probability of exit within
four years for ﬁrms present in 2004 and 2008. Distressed is an indicator variable equal to one if a ﬁrm has all of its relationships with banks
which became distressed during the ﬁnancial crisis and zero otherwise. Post − Crisis is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation
year is 2008 and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
industry level, in parentheses, where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%,5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels respectively.
In contrast, there is evidence to suggest that at all horizons, relatively more productive ﬁrms were adversely
aﬀected by having relationships with DistressedBanks. For ﬁrms in the lower middle of the productivity distri-
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bution (quartile 2), the change in the probability of exit at all horizons was signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms attached
to DistressedBanks rather than NonDistressedBanks, with the exit rate at the three-year horizon being 4.7
percentage points higher for ﬁrms attached to DistressedBanks than for ﬁrms attached to NonDistressedBanks.
For ﬁrms in the upper middle of the productivity distribution (quartile 3) the change in the probability of exit
is signiﬁcantly higher at the one-year and two-year horizons for ﬁrms attached to DistressedBanks, but not at the
three-year and four-year horizons. This suggests that while NonDistressedBanks provided support to these types
of ﬁrms in the immediate aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, this was not the case for higher than average productivity
ﬁrms with DistressedBanks.
For ﬁrms in the top quartile of the productivity distribution there is not a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the post-crisis
change in the exit rates of ﬁrms with DistressedBanks and NonDistressedBanks.
Overall, the results presented in Table 8 suggest that having a relationship with DistressedBanks appears to
have distorted the "cleansing" process of the ﬁnancial crisis, increasing the probability of exit for ﬁrms in the middle
of the productivity distribution and reducing it for the least productive ﬁrms. These eﬀects on the exit rates of
diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms are large in magnitude, but are masked on average across the sample (Table 7).
The most likely explanation for these results, consistent with the model presented in Section 2.1, is that ﬁrms at
the bottom of the productivity distribution are less reliant on external ﬁnance and so are not adversely aﬀected by
a tightening of credit conditions. If the most productive ﬁrms are those which typically are most reliant on external
ﬁnance, as suggested by Barlevy (2003), we would expect a tightening of credit conditions to adversely aﬀect the
middle of the productivity distribution. Another explanation is one which is consistent with forbearance by banks
on loans to less productive, "zombie" companies. If banks are unwilling to write-oﬀ bad loans to highly-indebted but
unproductive ﬁrms, these ﬁrms may not be susceptible to a tightening of credit conditions, whereas more productive
ﬁrms may suﬀer from either more costly credit or reduced credit availability, for example due to concern about
banks' balance sheet.
To test whether the productivity results from our quasi-experiment are indeed driven by changes in credit
conditions, we split our sample by leverage ratio into three groups (terciles) and then re-estimate our productivity
speciﬁcation for each leverage tercile. We expect highly leveraged ﬁrms to be more susceptible to changes in credit
conditions than other ﬁrms, and hence we might expect to see our productivity results more evident amongst higher
leverage ﬁrms.
In Tables 9 and 10 we report estimates of the eﬀect of being with a DistressedBank on the probability of
exit at diﬀerent horizons across the productivity distribution for each of our three leverage terciles. As shown
in Table 8 , having a relationship with DistressedBanks reduced the exit rate post-crisis of ﬁrms in the lowest
productivity quartile. These eﬀects were statistically signiﬁcant at the one and two year horizons. In the ﬁrst
row of Table 9 we see that these eﬀects are concentrated amongst low productivity ﬁrms in the highest leverage
tercile and are smaller in magnitude and not statistically signiﬁcant for lower leverage ﬁrms. These eﬀects are
thus consistent with distressed banks supporting zombie businesses to protect their own balance sheets. In Table
8 having a relationship with DistressedBanks increased the exit rate post-crisis for ﬁrms in the lower and upper
middle of the productivity distribution (quartiles 2 and 3). In the second row of Tables9 and 10 we see that the
estimated increases in exit rates for lower middle productivity ﬁrms are largest in magnitude amongst ﬁrms that
are also in the highest leverage tercile. These eﬀects are large. For example, for ﬁrms in the highest leverage tercile,
there is evidence that having a relationship with DistressedBanks increased the probability of exit for ﬁrms in the
lower middle of the productivity distribution by 5.9 percentage points at the two-year horizon and 10.1 percentage
points at the three-year horizon. These eﬀects should be seen in the context of an average exit rate for this group
of ﬁrms of around 8% at the two-year horizon and 11% at the three-year horizon. For ﬁrms in the upper middle of
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Table 9: Eﬀect of a Distressed Bank Relationship on Firm Exit, by Leverage and Productivity, 1 Year and 2 Year
Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lowest Leverage Tercile Middle Leverage Tercile Highest Leverage Tercile
1 Year Exit 2 Year Exit 1 Year Exit 2 Year Exit 1 Year Exit 2 Year Exit
Lowest Productivity Quartile
Distressed * Post-Crisis -0.011 -0.024 -0.004 -0.007 -0.036* -0.045*
(0.012) (0.021) (0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.027)
Productivity Quartile 2
Distressed * Post-Crisis -0.008 0.008 0.021* -0.003 0.029 0.059***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022)
Productivity Quartile 3
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.006 0.026** 0.017 0.001 0.020 0.022
(0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023)
Highest Productivity Quartile 4
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.003 -0.011 -0.011 -0.002 0.040* 0.040*
(0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
Mean Exit Rate
Quartile 1 0.016 0.042 0.021 0.053 0.045 0.112
Quartile 2 0.009 0.024 0.017 0.042 0.033 0.077
Quartile 3 0.007 0.018 0.007 0.030 0.020 0.066
Quartile 4 0.007 0.023 0.007 0.027 0.019 0.057
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.051 0.089 0.108 0.106 0.128 0.178
Observations 6925 6932 6906 6938 7014 7012
The Table reports estimates of Equation 3for each tercile of the leverage ratio distribution. In Columns 1 and 2 we consider the probability
of exit within two years and four years for ﬁrms present in the lowest leverage tercile. In Columns 3 and 4 we consider the probability of exit
within two years and four years for ﬁrms present in the middle leverage tercile. In Columns 5 and 6 we consider the probability of exit within
two years and four years for ﬁrms present in the highest leverage tercile. Distressed is an indicator variable equal to one if a ﬁrm has all of its
relationships with banks which became distressed during the ﬁnancial crisis and zero otherwise. Post − Crisis is an indicator variable equal
to one if the observation year is 2008 and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the industry level, in parentheses, where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%,5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels respectively.
the productivity distribution (quartile 3) increases in exit rates are generally less signiﬁcant. When we diﬀerentiate
our results by leverage tercile in Table 9 we also ﬁnd some evidence of an increase in one- and two-year exit rates
amongst ﬁrms in the highest productivity quartile concentrated amongst the highly leveraged group. These eﬀects
on ﬁrms in the highest productivity quartile were not evident in Table 8 where we considered all leverage groups
together.
Taken together, the results in Tables 9 and 10 support the interpretation that the distortion to the cleansing
process of the ﬁnancial crisis associated with having a relationship with a DistressedBank is driven by changes in
credit conditions.
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Table 10: Eﬀect of a Distressed Bank Relationship on Firm Exit, by Leverage and Productivity, 3 Year and 4 Year
Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lowest Leverage Tercile Middle Leverage Tercile Highest Leverage Tercile
3 Year Exit 4 Year Exit 3 Year Exit 4 Year Exit 3 Year Exit 4 Year Exit
Lowest Productivity Quartile
Distressed * Post-Crisis -0.028 0.006 -0.014 -0.017 -0.058 -0.041
(0.027) (0.038) (0.041) (0.044) (0.039) (0.033)
Productivity Quartile 2
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.020 0.001 0.013 0.037 0.101*** 0.064*
(0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.035)
Productivity Quartile 3
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.001 0.012 0.015 0.010 -0.024 0.004
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.037) (0.045)
Highest Productivity Quartile 4
Distressed * Post-Crisis -0.008 0.015 -0.020 0.002 -0.001 0.009
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.028) (0.034)
Mean Exit Rate
Quartile 1 0.068 0.117 0.096 0.153 0.172 0.230
Quartile 2 0.039 0.067 0.067 0.095 0.114 0.138
Quartile 3 0.030 0.047 0.052 0.076 0.099 0.149
Quartile 4 0.041 0.061 0.047 0.068 0.088 0.126
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.134 0.169 0.148 0.183 0.225 0.276
Observations 7091 7149 7076 7133 6987 6989
The Table reports estimates of Equation 3for each tercile of the leverage ratio distribution. In Columns 1 and 2 we consider the probability
of exit within two years and four years for ﬁrms present in the lowest leverage tercile. In Columns 3 and 4 we consider the probability of exit
within two years and four years for ﬁrms present in the middle leverage tercile. In Columns 5 and 6 we consider the probability of exit within
two years and four years for ﬁrms present in the highest leverage tercile. Distressed is an indicator variable equal to one if a ﬁrm has all of its
relationships with banks which became distressed during the ﬁnancial crisis and zero otherwise. Post − Crisis is an indicator variable equal
to one if the observation year is 2008 and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the industry level, in parentheses, where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%,5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels respectively.
6.4 Placebo Crises
Our diﬀerence in diﬀerence speciﬁcation relies on the assumption of parallel trends in exit rates for ﬁrms which had
relationships with the banks that we have classiﬁed as DistressedBanks and ﬁrms which had relationships with the
banks that we have classiﬁed as NonDistressedBanks had there not been a ﬁnancial crisis. To provide evidence of
parallel trends in the absence of a ﬁnancial crisis, we undertake placebo tests where we consider alternative placebo
"crisis" periods.
In Table 11 we consider placebo "crises" for the two year exit probability. In column 1 we report the results
from estimating the baseline speciﬁcation for the two year exit probability, with 2002 as the control period and
2004 as the placebo "crisis" period. In column 2, we use 2004 as our control period and 2006 as our placebo "crisis"
period. Finally, for comparison, in column 3 we reproduce our baseline result, in which the control period is 2006
and the true crisis period is 2008. We report the estimates for the coeﬃcient on the interaction between having a
relationship with DistressedBanks and the placebo "crisis" period (β3 in Equation 1). The results suggest that
for the two placebo "crises" considered, having a relationship with DistressedBanks did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
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probability of exit at the two year horizon. This contrasts with the true crisis period in which the results suggest
that having a relationship with DistressedBanks increased the probability of exit by around 0.4 percentage points.
In Table 12 we consider a placebo "crisis" for the three year exit probability. In column 1 we report the results
from estimating the baseline speciﬁcation with 2002 as the control period and 2005 as the crisis period. The results
suggest that for the placebo "crisis", having a relationship with DistressedBanks did not signiﬁcantly increase
the three year exit rate. In column 2 we reproduce our baseline result for the three year exit rate, in which the
control period is 2005 and the true crisis period is 2008. In this case, having a relationship with DistressedBanks
signiﬁcantly increased the probability of exit by around 0.6 percentage points.
These results conﬁrm that exit rates rose for ﬁrms that had a relationship with DistressedBanks following the
actual crisis in a way that they did not in other similar periods, suggesting that the higher exit rate was a genuine
reaction to changes that occurred for customers of DistressedBanks after the crisis.
Table 11: Placebo Crises, 2 Year Exit Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Placebo Placebo Actual
Crisis=2004 Crisis=2006 Crisis=2008
Distressed * Placebo Crisis -0.002 -0.000 0.004**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Mean Exit Rate 0.089 0.098 0.100
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.147 0.167 0.174
Observations 280057 301887 320485
Notes: The Table reports the empirical link between the probability of a ﬁrm exiting an industry within 2 years and the banking relationships
a ﬁrm has. In each speciﬁcation, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 2
years. In Column 1 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2002 and 2004, where the placebo crisis is deﬁned
as 2004. In Column 2 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2004 and 2006, where the placebo crisis is
deﬁned as 2006. In Column 3 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2006 and 2008, where the actual crisis is
deﬁned as 2008, consistent with our baseline analysis. Distressed is an indicator variable equal to one if a ﬁrm has all of its relationships with
banks which became distressed during the ﬁnancial crisis and zero otherwise. ”Crisis” is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation
year is the crisis year and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls. Standard errors in parentheses,
where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%,5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels respectively.
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Table 12: Placebo Crises, 3 Year Exit Rate
(1) (2)
Placebo Actual
Crisis=2005 Crisis=2008
Distressed * Placebo Crisis -0.003 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003)
Mean Exit Rate 0.142 0.149
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.208 0.226
Observations 292810 315623
Notes: The Table reports the empirical link between the probability of a ﬁrm exiting an industry within 3 years and the banking relationships
a ﬁrm has. In each speciﬁcation, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 3
years. In Column 1 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2002 and 2005, where the crisis is deﬁned as
2005. In Column 2 we consider the probability of exit within three years for ﬁrms present in 2005 and 2008, where the crisis is deﬁned as
2008. Distressed is an indicator variable equal to one if a ﬁrm has all of its relationships with banks which became distressed during the
ﬁnancial crisis and zero otherwise. ”Crisis” is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation year is the crisis year and zero otherwise.
All speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls.Standard errors in parentheses, where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels respectively.
7 Conclusion
This paper suggests that the tightening in credit conditions faced by UK ﬁrms following the ﬁnancial crisis had a
detrimental impact on their probability of survival and may have distorted the productivity distribution of exiting
ﬁrms. Exploiting pre-crisis banking relationships as an exogenous source of a tightening in credit conditions faced by
ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that the change in the probability of exit following the ﬁnancial crisis was higher for ﬁrms which were
attached to banks which became distressed relative to the change for ﬁrms which were attached to non-distressed
banks. Underlying these changes on average across ﬁrms we ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences across the productivity
distribution. We ﬁnd that being attached to DistressedBanks did not increase the probability of exit for the least
productive ﬁrms; in fact it reduced the probability of exit for these ﬁrms, but increased the probability of exit for
relatively more productive ﬁrms. These eﬀects imply that the crisis may have had "scarring " as well as "cleansing"
eﬀects. Our results suggest that following the crisis some ﬁrms which were not in the lower tail of the productivity
distribution may have been forced to exit their industry as a result of tighter credit conditions.
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Appendix
A 1: Model of Firm Dynamics
A 1.1 Firm Maximisation Problem
As described in Section 2, upon entry, the problem of the ﬁrm is to choose its price, quantity and repayment to
maximise proﬁts subject to three constraints:
max
p(ϕ),q(ϕ),F (ϕ,di)
pi(ϕ, di) = p(ϕ)q(ϕ)−
[
q(ϕ)
ϕ + (1− di)f + λF (ϕ, di) + (1− λ)tfe
]
subject to
(1) q(ϕ) = Q
[
p(ϕ)
P
]−σ
(2) F (ϕ, di) ≤ p(ϕ)q(ϕ)− q(ϕ)ϕ − (1− di)f
(3) dif ≤ λF (ϕ, di) + (1− λ)tfe
We assume perfect competition among ﬁnancial intermediaries, such that constraint (3) binds with equality.
Substituting this and constraint (1) into the proﬁt condition and assuming that constraint (2) does not bind
suggests that the ﬁrm's problem simpliﬁes to:
max
p(ϕ)
pi(ϕ) = Qp(ϕ)
1−σ
Pσ −
[
Q
ϕ
[
p(ϕ)
P
]−σ
+ f
]
The ﬁrst order condition for the ﬁrm implies that ﬁrms set prices as a markup over their variable costs, as in the
standard closed economy version of Melitz (2003):
p(ϕ) = σ(σ−1)ϕ =
1
ρϕ
Hence ﬁrm proﬁts are given by:
pi(ϕ) = r(ϕ)σ − f
A 1.2 Productivity Thresholds
Upon entry, ﬁrms will choose to produce providing that their productivity, ϕ , is suﬃciently large to ensure that
proﬁts are non-negative, pi(ϕ) ≥ 0 and constraint (2) is satisﬁed. Using constraint (3), constraint (2) can be
expressed as:
(1− λ)(F − tfe) ≤ pi(ϕ)
If the repayment F is greater than the collateral available to be seized, tfe , then constraint (2) is more stringent
on required productivity than the non-negative proﬁts condition and will bind ﬁrst. This will be the case if the
upfront ﬁxed cost requirement is suﬃciently large :
dif ≥ tfe
If the upfront ﬁxed cost requirement is suﬃciently large, we can deﬁne a productivity threshold for each level of di,
ϕ∗di , such that constraint (2) binds with equality. Firms with an upfront ﬁxed cost requirement di and a productivity
level below the associated threshold will not produce. The threshold is given by:
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f
(
1− di + diλ
)− (1−λ)tfeλ = r(ϕ∗di )σ
f + 1−λλ (dif − tfe) =
r(ϕ∗di )
σ
If however the upfront ﬁxed cost requirement is small, such that dif < tfe, then the non-negative proﬁts condition
binds before constraint (2). In this case, the productivity threshold, ϕ∗di , is given by:
f =
r(ϕ∗di )
σ
A 1.3 Relative Threshold Condition
Using the expression for the ratio of expenditures, we can also obtain an expression for the relationship between
the threshold productivity for ﬁrms facing a high upfront ﬁxed cost, ϕ∗dH , and the threshold productivity for ﬁrms
facing a low upfront ﬁxed cost, ϕ∗dL .
r(ϕ∗dH ) =
(
ϕ∗dH
ϕ∗dL
)σ−1
r(ϕ∗dL)
Assuming that the upfront ﬁxed cost requirements are suﬃciently large, the relative threshold condition is given
by:(
ϕ∗dH
ϕ∗dL
)
=
(
f+ 1−λλ (dHf−tfe)
f+ 1−λλ (dLf−tfe)
) 1
σ−1
A 1.4 Cutoﬀ Proﬁt Conditions
We can deﬁne a weighted average of productivity for ﬁrms which have a high upfront ﬁxed cost requirement, given
by ϕ˜dH , and for ﬁrms which have a low upfront ﬁxed cost requirement, given by ϕ˜dL :
ϕ˜dH =
[∫∞
ϕ∗dH
(ϕ)σ−1 g(ϕ)1−G(ϕ∗dH )
dϕ
] 1
σ−1
ϕ˜dL =
[∫∞
ϕ∗dL
(ϕ)σ−1 g(ϕ)1−G(ϕ∗dL )
dϕ
] 1
σ−1
We can express the revenue of a ﬁrm which has productivity equal to the weighted average productivity as:
r(ϕ˜di) =
(
ϕ˜di
ϕ∗di
)σ−1
r(ϕ∗di)
Hence the proﬁt of a ﬁrm with productivity equal to the weighted average productivity is given by:
pi(ϕ˜di) =
1
σ
(
ϕ˜di
ϕ∗di
)σ−1
r(ϕ∗di)− f
If the upfront ﬁxed cost is suﬃciently large such that constraint 2 binds, then:
f + 1−λλ (dif − tfe) = 1σ r(ϕ∗Ai)
Hence
pi(ϕ˜di) =
(
f + 1−λλ (dif − tfe)
) ( ϕ˜di
ϕ∗di
)σ−1
− f
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In the case where there are no ﬁnancing frictions (λ = 1) then the cutoﬀ condition reduces to the zero cutoﬀ proﬁt
condition in the benchmark Melitz (2003) closed economy model, given by:
pi(ϕ˜di) = f
((
ϕ˜di
ϕ∗di
)σ−1
− 1
)
Alternatively, if the upfront cost is small, such that dif < tfe, then the non negative proﬁt condition binds before
constraint 2 and it can be shown that the cutoﬀ condition is then also given by the zero cutoﬀ proﬁt condition.
A 1.4 Free Entry Condition
Once a ﬁrm has entered, we assume each period they face an exogenous probability δ of exit. The value of entry is
therefore given by:
ve = χ
(
1−G(ϕ∗dH )
) (pi(ϕ˜dH )
δ
)
+ (1− χ) (1−G(ϕ∗dL)) (pi(ϕ˜dL )δ )− fe
Given free entry, in equilibrium the value of entry is equal to zero: ve = 0. Hence:
χ
(
1−G(ϕ∗dH )
)
pi(ϕ˜dH ) + (1− χ)
(
1−G(ϕ∗dL)
)
pi(ϕ˜dL) = δfe
A 1.5 Solving the Model
Together the two cutoﬀ proﬁt conditions, the relative cutoﬀ condition and the free entry condition provide four
equations with four unknowns (ϕ∗dH ϕ
∗
dL
pi(ϕ˜dH ) pi(ϕ˜dL) ). We can use these four equations, summarised below, to
solve for the productivity cutoﬀs of ﬁrms which face a high upfront ﬁxed and ﬁrms which face a low upfront ﬁxed
cost and their average proﬁts.
(1)
(
ϕ∗dH
ϕ∗dL
)
=
(
f+ 1−λλ (dHf−tfe)
f+ 1−λλ (dLf−tfe)
) 1
σ−1
(2) pi(ϕ˜dH ) =
(
f + 1−λλ (dHf − tfe)
)( ϕ˜dH
ϕ∗dH
)σ−1
− f
(3) pi(ϕ˜dL) =
(
f + 1−λλ (dLf − tfe)
)( ϕ˜dL
ϕ∗dL
)σ−1
− f
(4) χ
(
1−G(ϕ∗dH )
)
pi(ϕ˜dH ) + (1− χ)
(
1−G(ϕ∗dL)
)
pi(ϕ˜dL) = δfe
A 1.6 Calibration
So that we can illustrate comparative statics, we calibrate the model, closely following the approach of Melitz
and Redding (2013). The elasticity of substitution between ﬁrm varieties is set as σ = 4. We assume that ﬁrm
productivity follows a Pareto distribution, such that:
G(ϕ) =
1-(
ϕmin
ϕ )
k ϕ ≥ ϕmin
0 otherwise
The Pareto shape parameter is set as k = 4.25 and we set ϕmin equal to one. The probability of ﬁrm exit is set as
δ = 0.025. The ﬁxed entry cost is set as fe = 1 with the fraction which can be seized as collateral set as t = 0.1.
The ﬁxed cost of production is set as f = 0.2. The high upfront ﬁxed cost requirement is set as dH = 0.9 and
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the low upfront ﬁxed cost requirement is set asdL = 0.55, with the probability of a the high upfront ﬁxed cost
requirement set as χ = 0.5. In the illustrative example of a tightening of credit conditions in Figure 2, we consider
how the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of productivity levels in the economy changes as λ decreases from
λ1 = 0.7 to λ2 = 0.5.
A 2: Robustness Tests
A 2.1 Non-linear Model
Our baseline analysis uses a linear probability model to consider the impact of a tightening in credit availability
following the ﬁnancial crisis. As a robustness check, we estimate a probit model, including the same controls as
in our baseline speciﬁcation in Equation (1). In Table 13 , we report the marginal eﬀect of interest, found by
computing the cross diﬀerences of the expected probability of exit with respect to the treatment indicator and the
post-crisis indicator.21 The marginal eﬀects are evaluated at the mean values of the other control variables. The
results are signiﬁcant and similar in magnitude to those presented in our baseline analysis, suggesting that the
change in the probability of exit was signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms with DistressedBanks following the crisis than
for ﬁrms attached to NonDistressedBanks.
Table 13: Probit Model, Marginal Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3)
2 Year 3 Year 4 Year
Distressed * Post-crisis 0.004∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 295744 291200 281022
Notes: The Table reports the marginal eﬀects from the probit representation of Equation (1) . The marginal eﬀects are evaluated at the mean
of the control variables. In Column 1 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2006 and 2008. The dependent
variable in Column 1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 2 years. In Column 2 we consider the
probability of exit within three years for ﬁrms present in 2005 and 2008. The dependent variable in Column 2 is a dummy variable equal to
one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 3 years. In Column 3 we consider the probability of exit within four years for ﬁrms present
in 2004 and 2008. All speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, in
parentheses, where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels respectively.
A 2.2 Deﬁnition of Treatment Group
In our baseline analysis, we divide our sample of ﬁrms into Treatment and Control groups based on which banks
they had relationships with in 2008. We identify banking relationships using the annual accounts which ﬁrms ﬁle
and we associate a ﬁrm's annual accounts with year t if it ﬁles its accounts between April of year t and March of
year t + 1, in line with the ﬁnancial year in the UK. Therefore Treatment and Control groups are assigned using
accounts ﬁled between April 2008 and March 2009. Given that the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme was announced
in October 2008, it is possible that ﬁrms ﬁling accounts after this time may have already adjusted to the distress
experienced by some UK banks. For example, ﬁrms which were able to readily switch banking relationships may have
switched away from the DistressedBanks. For robustness, we therefore repeat our analysis using lagged banking
relationships to establish Treatment and Control groups. Our Treatment group now consists of ﬁrms which
reported having relationships with just DistressedBanks in their accounts associated with the previous year (year
21See Ai and Norton (2003) for a discussion of interpreting interaction terms in probit models.
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t − 1) . Our control group consists of ﬁrms which reported having relationships with just NonDistressedBanks
in their accounts from the previous year. We exclude from our sample ﬁrms which report having relationships with
a combination of both DistressedBanks and NonDistressedBanks in their accounts from the previous year and
we also exclude ﬁrms which do not have any identiﬁable relationships with banks. In Table 14 we report the results
from estimating our baseline speciﬁcation using this new deﬁnition of our Treatment and Control groups. The
change in the probability of exit remains signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms with DistressedBanks following the crisis
than for ﬁrms attached to NonDistressedBanks at the 3 and 4 year horizons.
In Table 15 we report the results from estimating our productivity speciﬁcation using our new deﬁnition of our
Treatment and Control groups. Consistent with our main analysis, the results suggest that the probability of exit
for low productivity ﬁrms which had a relationship with DistressedBanks was not adversely aﬀected following the
ﬁnancial crisis relative to those ﬁrms which were attached to NonDistressedBanks. At the one, two and three
year horizon, the change in the probability of exit following the crisis is signiﬁcantly lower for ﬁrms in the lowest
productivity quartile attached to DistressedBanks. In contrast, for ﬁrms in the second productivity quartile, the
change in the probability of exit at the three year and four year horizon following the ﬁnancial crisis was signiﬁcantly
higher for ﬁrms attached to DistressedBanks than for ﬁrms attached to NonDistressedBanks.
Table 14: Eﬀect of a Distressed Bank Relationship on Firm Exit, Alternative Treatment Group Deﬁnition.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Year Exit 2 Year Exit 3 Year Exit 4 Year Exit
Distressed 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Post-Crisis -0.005*** -0.000 0.016*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Distressed * Post-Crisis -0.000 0.002 0.005* 0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Mean Exit Rate 0.042 0.092 0.139 0.179
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No No No
R-Squared 0.054 0.077 0.085 0.094
Observations 277648 274570 262416 253704
Notes: The Table reports the empirical link between the probability of a ﬁrm exiting an industry and the banking relationships a ﬁrm has. In
Column 1 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2006 and 2008. The dependent variable in Column 1 is a
dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 2 years. In Column 2 we consider the probability of exit within
three years for ﬁrms present in 2005 and 2008. The dependent variable in Column 2 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently
exits in the following 3 years. In Column 3 we consider the probability of exit within four years for ﬁrms present in 2004 and 2008. The
dependent variable in Column 3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 4 years. Distressed is an
indicator variable equal to one if in the previous period (year t− 1) the ﬁrm has all of its relationships with banks which became distressed
during the ﬁnancial crisis and zero otherwise. Post− crisis is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation year is 2008 and zero
otherwise. Both speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls. Industry ﬁxed eﬀects at the 2-digit SIC code level. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the industry level, in parentheses, where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels
respectively.
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Table 15: Eﬀect of a Distressed Bank Relationship on Firm Exit, by Productivity Quartile. Alternative Treatment
Group Deﬁnition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Year Exit 2 Year Exit 3 Year Exit 4 Year Exit
Lowest Productivity Quartile
Distressed 0.023** 0.018 0.015 -0.022
(0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016)
Post-Crisis 0.017* 0.007 0.011 -0.016
(0.010) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
Distressed * Post-Crisis -0.041*** -0.039** -0.054** -0.010
(0.013) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023)
Productivity Quartile 2
Distressed -0.003 -0.009 -0.019 -0.014
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
Post-Crisis -0.007 -0.017* -0.027** -0.043***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.007 0.014 0.035** 0.036*
(0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018)
Productivity Quartile 3
Distressed -0.012* -0.004 -0.000 -0.016
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Post-Crisis -0.018*** -0.017** -0.008 -0.015
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.017** 0.011 0.000 0.018
(0.008) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019)
Highest Productivity Quartile
Distressed -0.009 0.000 0.003 -0.014
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Post-Crisis -0.008 -0.003 -0.001 -0.011
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
Distressed * Post-Crisis 0.005 -0.003 -0.010 0.001
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Mean Exit Rate
Quartile 1 0.030 0.069 0.116 0.163
Quartile 2 0.018 0.042 0.066 0.094
Quartile 3 0.010 0.035 0.056 0.081
Quartile 4 0.010 0.030 0.051 0.073
Industry Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.064 0.092 0.129 0.168
Observations 17767 17778 17627 18092
The Table reports estimates of Equation 3. In Column 1 we consider the probability of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2006 and 2008.
The dependent variable in Column 1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm subsequently exits in the following 2 years. In Column 2 we
consider the probability of exit within three years for ﬁrms present in 2005 and 2008. In Column 3 we consider the probability of exit within
four years for ﬁrms present in 2004 and 2008. Distressed is an indicator variable equal to one if in the previous period (year t− 1) the ﬁrm has
all of its relationships with banks which became distressed during the ﬁnancial crisis and zero otherwise. Post− crisis is an indicator variable
equal to one if the observation year is 2008 and zero otherwise. Both speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrm controls. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the industry level, in parentheses, where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%,5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels
respectively.
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A 2.2 Weighted Regression
As noted above, one drawback of our productivity sample is that is limited to ﬁrms with banking relationships
which report Operating Profits, Employees and CostOf Employees in their annual statements. As a result, the
sample is not representative of the population of ﬁrms which have banking relationships. In particular, the sample
under-represents smaller ﬁrms which are not required to report detailed accounts. To address this concern, we assign
re-sampling weights to each ﬁrm-year observation which are based on the number of ﬁrms in each industry-size-year
cell, following a similar procedure to Gal (2013). The weights scale up the observations in the productivity sample
so that they match the number of ﬁrms in each industry-size-bank group-year cell in our baseline sample of ﬁrms.22
Using these weights, we then estimate our productivity speciﬁcation, given by Equation 3.23 Consistent with the
unweighted results, the weighted results reported in Table 16 suggest that for the lowest productivity ﬁrms there was
no adverse impact of having a relationship with DistressedBanks following the ﬁnancial crisis. In contrast, there
is evidence that for relatively more productive ﬁrms relationships with DistressedBanks increased the probability
of exit.
22We assume that our baseline sample is representative of the population of UK ﬁrms with banking relationships. We take our baseline
sample and divide it into cells which count the number of ﬁrms by year, industry (using 1 digit SIC codes), three size groups (using
terciles of the distribution of total assets) and bank group (using DistressedBanks and NonDistressedBanks). We also divide our
productivity sample into the same cells and calculate re-sampling weights using the number of ﬁrms in each cell for the baseline sample
relative to the productivity sample. Given the relatively low number of observations in some 1 digit SIC code groups, we group SIC
codes 1,2, 3 and 4 together and group SIC codes 5 and 6 together.
23The implicit assumption made is that ﬁrms in the productivity sample within a given industry-size-bank group-year cell are
representative of the population within that cell.
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Table 16: Weighted Regression. Eﬀect of a Distressed Bank Relationship on Firm Exit, by Productivity Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 year exit 2 year exit 3 year exit 4 year exit
Lowest Productivity Quartile
Distressed 0.009 0.027 -0.017 -0.060**
(0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.030)
Post-crisis 0.035* 0.019 0.088*** 0.051
(0.019) (0.025) (0.028) (0.035)
Distressed * Post-crisis -0.060** -0.052 -0.077* -0.049
(0.027) (0.036) (0.042) (0.046)
Productivity Quartile 2
Distressed -0.001 0.001 -0.034 -0.029
(0.011) (0.023) (0.027) (0.030)
Post-crisis -0.006 -0.007 -0.013 0.033
(0.016) (0.024) (0.031) (0.033)
Distressed * Post-crisis 0.010 0.040 0.069* 0.070*
(0.020) (0.032) (0.037) (0.038)
Productivity Quartile 3
Distressed -0.019*** -0.033** -0.026 -0.024
(0.007) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025)
Post-crisis -0.014 -0.013 0.061 0.100**
(0.010) (0.021) (0.040) (0.040)
Distressed * Post-crisis 0.024** 0.008 -0.022 -0.013
(0.011) (0.028) (0.044) (0.048)
Highest Productivity Quartile
Distressed -0.014 -0.011 0.007 -0.022
(0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016)
Post-crisis -0.025*** -0.015 0.031 0.007
(0.009) (0.015) (0.019) (0.025)
Distressed * Post-crisis 0.016 0.010 0.004 0.035*
(0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021)
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.138 0.199 0.241 0.283
Observations 20238 20549 20848 20972
The Table reports estimates of Equation 3. Firm year observations are weighted to scale up the observations in the productivity sample so
that they match the number of ﬁrms in each industry-size--year cell in our baseline sample of ﬁrms. In Column 1 we consider the probability
of exit within two years for ﬁrms present in 2006 and 2008. The dependent variable in Column 1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm
subsequently exits in the following 2 years. In Column 2 we consider the probability of exit within three years for ﬁrms present in 2005 and
2008. In Column 3 we consider the probability of exit within four years for ﬁrms present in 2004 and 2008. Distressed is an indicator variable
equal to one if a ﬁrm has all of its relationships with banks which became distressed during the ﬁnancial crisis and zero otherwise. Post− crisis
is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation year is 2008 and zero otherwise. Both speciﬁcations include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and
ﬁrm controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, in parentheses, where ***, **, * shows signiﬁcance at the 1%,5% and 10%
signiﬁcance levels respectively.
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